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A Director's Good Faith
ELIZABETH

A. NOWICKIt

The last decade has witnessed the evolution of a
surprising and disconcerting trend: corporations have
imploded due to various acts of corporate mismanagement,
and corporate directors have ably avoided liability for not
having prevented these disasters. This trend is surprising
because, as a technical matter, directors are responsible for
running corporations, and directors are obligated to do so in
good faith. Therefore, one would not intuit that directors
should be free from liability for their failings. But they are.
To the second year law student in a basic corporate law
class, this disconnect between disaster and liability seems
odd. To the corporate law scholar who has watched the
evolution over the past two decades of "good faith"
jurisprudence as it applies to director conduct, this gaping
responsibility gorge is unsurprising. It raises the critical
question: if directors are not going to be responsible for
corporate disasters, then who?
Judicial attempts to enforce a director's obligation to
act in good faith-what I refer to as the "bastardization of
the phrase, 'not in good faith"'-fall away as merely
restrictions on directors acting affirmatively in bad faith.
And the attempts of other scholars to propound on good
faith seem to only be focused on understanding what the
courts are doing, as opposed to guiding what the judiciary
should be doing. Moreover, the recent judicial emphasis on
the phrase "good faith" appears not to have been preceded
by any sort of thoughtful discussion on what that phrase
can and should mean. The haphazard, unprincipled
invocation and application of this phrase threatens the
foundation of the corporate law realm-the implicit
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Washington &
Lee University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A., Russell Sage
College. Many thanks to Jeffrey Gleason, Anshu Pasricha, and the Buffalo Law
Review for their superb editing. Outstanding research assistance was provided
by Jennifer Jennings, Justin Curtis, and Kristin Watts.
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historical
agreement
that
directors
will
manage
corporations in the best interests of the corporate entity and
its owning shareholders.
This Article attempts to more thoughtfully review the
phrase "good faith" as it is relevant in the director liability
context. While not professing to definitively end the "good
faith" definitional discussion, this Article ultimately offers a
considered, principled draft definition of good faith, from
which further discussion among academics and jurists could
evolve.
INTRODUCTION

Shareholders are the owners of corporations. Directors
are the managers of corporations, and they are obligated by
statute to manage their corporate charge on behalf of the
shareholders, to the benefit of the corporation and
shareholders. Yet common law and state statutes protect
directors broadly from personal liability for their acts or
omissions. Directors are afforded significant deference in
what they specifically do (or do not do) to manage
corporations, provided the directors act "in good faith."
Ultimately, directors are only personally liable to their
shareholders if the directors do not act "in good faith."1
But what does "in good faith" mean, and what
constitutes a failure to act in good faith? Interestingly,
corporate law does not yet have a universally agreed-upon,
usable definition for the phrase "in good faith," despite its
existence in corporate governance parlance for at least over
a century. The lack of good faith parameters and, more
importantly, lack of clear guidance on what good faith
requires of a director is troubling. It is difficult to obligate
directors to act in good faith or penalize directors for not
acting in good faith without an affirmative definition of
good faith to offer to the directors.
With every passing day in the corporate world, the need
for some workable, logical, enforceable standard for
defining good faith becomes more urgent. The corporate
landscape of the recent past is littered with corporate

1. Discussions about loyalty and conflicts are deliberately omitted from this
Article.
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governance failures, sex scandals, 2 executive gluttony, 3
corporate lethargy, 4 outright corporate looting, 5 significant
valuation depression, and disgruntled stockholders. 6 Many
of these situations could have been avoided or the carnage
limited had directors detected wrongdoing sooner. Surely
some of these situations, then, should have somehow been
tied to a discussion of a director's obligation to act "in good
faith." Without agreement on how to specifically define good
faith in the director liability realm, however, it is difficult to
convincingly argue that a director failed to act in good faith.
This absence of debate and dialogue regarding good
faith would likely surprise any average American investor
who is not a corporate law guru. The average investor, if
asked whether directors who missed overt acts of financial
fraud, who sanctioned, without question, outrageous pay
packages, who remained uninvolved in important senior
hiring, and who ignored significant shareholder dissent
were acting in good faith, would likely answer "no," relying
only on her common sense understanding of "good faith" as
the phrase is used in common parlance. Yet, the corporate

2. See Owen Moritz, Bada Boeing! CEO Out 37M, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar.
11, 2005, at 18 (discussing how former Boeing CEO, Harry Stonecipher,
violated the company code of ethics when he had an affair with a company vicepresident).
3. See Mark Maremont, Amid Crackdown, The Jet Perk Suddenly Looks a
Lot Pricier, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2005, at Al (discussing personal use by
corporate executives of corporation-owned jets; values of the personal use were
often well above $500,000 for 2004).
4. "In 1986 Carl Icahn gave this account of a directors' meeting at a big
company: 'Literally, half the board is dozing off. The other half is reading the
Wall Street Journal. And then they put slides up a lot and nobody can
understand the slides and when it gets dark they all doze off."' Asleep in the
Boardroom, WASH. POST, May 23, 2002, at A32.
5. See Constance L. Hays, As Stewart Attends Hearing, Company Studies
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at C1 (discussing the board of directors of
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia grappling with Martha Stewart's position in
the company after she was convicted of criminal obstruction of justice).
6. See David Barboza, From Enron's Rubble, Life on a Luxury Tightrope,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 3, at 1 (describing how thousands of former Enron
employees lost millions of dollars in retirement benefits); see also Ronald
Brownstein, Enron Fallout Proves Personal Loss Can Have Big Political
Consequences, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A10 (discussing how widespread
increases in the diversity of stock ownership over the past twenty-five years has
led to widespread interest in the Enron scandal, particularly with respect to
how the stock of Enron was devastated by the scandals).
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the world of
governance bar is unwilling to venture into
7
common sense and common language usage.
The failure to define the behavioral standards relevant
to a director's obligation to act "in good faith" might explain,
in part, why few corporate directors have been publicly
pilloried for the failings of their corporate charges despite
the fact that these failings have cost investors billions of
dollars. The "good faith" definitional void might explain, at
least in part, why there has been no self-revolution within
the corporate directorate, and why Wall Street is not lined
shoulder-to-shoulder with directors racing to the pulpit to
atone. To be sure, the corporate landscape has been
smattered with a few weak stabs at federal regulation, a
fair amount of academic posturing, and a good amount of
vacuous politicking. But there has yet to be a line drawn in
the sand regarding a director's good faith obligation, across
which line a director dare not find himself for fear of
liability for his failure to act in good faith.
This Article attempts to draw such a line. Specifically
in this Article, I call for a purposeful, affirmative definition
of good faith that reflects the historical usage and the
contextual import of the phrase in the director qua
fiduciary realm. The phrase "in good faith" is a much more
powerful phrase than the corporate bar, the American
directorate, and the judiciary are willing to admit. The
phrase should be defined in a sensible manner, to allow
investors to demand more from their directors. With this
Article, I hope to engage the academy in a more thorough
discussion of the definition of good faith in the director
liability context. In this Article, I assemble, analyze, and
justify an affirmative definition of "good faith."
In Part I of this Article, I describe generally a director's
fiduciary duty of care, as a foundation for the discussions in
the rest of the Article. I explain the duty of care standard of
conduct and I examine the standard of review that is
7. Many of the failures we have seen at the helm of many large
corporations-much of the lax behavior and inattention in the boardroomwould be cause for termination in any other line of employment. Yet, such
behavior is tolerated in the world of corporate governance. See generally Lyman
P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why CorporateOfficers Are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (discussing fiduciary duties in the context of
the role that corporate officers and directors have played in recent corporate
scandals).
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applied by courts when faced with an alleged breach of a
director's duty of care. In this Part, I explore the workings
of the ephemeral business judgment rule, which is best
described as a protective presumption that is automatically
afforded to a director whose conduct is under judicial review
based on an alleged duty-of-care breach. I explain how the
business judgment rule presumption works to protect
directors from being second-guessed by complaining
shareholders and when the protections of the business
judgment rule presumption will be stripped from a director.
I then briefly explore legislative limitations on a director's
liability exposure, such as Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) §102(b)(7). I end this Part with a summary of
how the phrase "good faith" plays into this duty-of-care and
director-liability calculus to emphasize the import of the
definition of good faith in the director liability context. The
protection of DGCL § 102(b)(7), which serves to completely
insulate directors from personal liability to shareholders for
monetary damages due to a director's breach of his duty of
care, will not be afforded to a director who has acted "not in
good faith."'8 I explain that, if good faith continues to be
misinterpreted in a very favorable way to directors,
personal liability for a director's breach of almost all of his
fiduciary duties, except for his duty of loyalty, will
effectively cease to exist.
Part II of this Article contains the definitional analysis
of the phrase "good faith." In this Part, I consult the
dictionary for a technical definition of good faith, I examine
the interpretation of good faith in other areas of the law, I
parse through the common law to assess which definitional
components of good faith from other areas of the law to
borrow and which to ignore, and I examine the context in
which a director does his job and in which director liability
becomes relevant. I conclude Part II with a summary of
observations that can be made about good faith as it arises
and is defined in other contexts.
In Part III, I use the above examination to construct
and justify a definition of good faith to be considered for use
in the director liability realm. In Part IV, I use this draft
definition of good faith and parts of the analysis I
constructed in order to define good faith to deal with a

8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
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compelling good faith issue that appears to be ignored by
jurists and other scholars alike. Specifically, in Part IV of
this Article, I address the legal question of what it means
for a director to act "not in good faith," such that he is
outside the protection of the business judgment rule
presumption, he is outside the protection of a statutory
liability-limiting provision, and he has violated his fiduciary
obligation. Oddly, a director's legal obligation to act in good
faith has almost always been treated as the legal obligation
to not act in bad faith, notwithstanding the fact that the
lack of good faith and an affirmative act of bad faith are two
different things. This manipulation of the good faith
parlance troubles me because requiring a plaintiff to prove
that a director acted in true bad faith, as opposed to having
to prove that a director exhibited a lack of good faith,
imposes a significant burden on the plaintiff, making his
case far more difficult than it otherwise would be. In
addition, this bastardization of the phrases "good faith" and
"not in good faith" erodes the essence of one of the pillars of
corporate governance-the obligation of corporate agents to
act in the best interests of the corporation. Using my "good
faith" definition developed in Part III of this Article, I
discuss in Part V how a good faith analysis is supposed to
proceed when it is alleged that a director failed to act in
good faith.
I.

DUTY OF CARE

One of the defining characteristics of the corporate form
is the separation of ownership and control. 9 Shareholders
"own" the corporation, but the board of directors "controls"
the corporation' 0 and is responsible for managing the
9. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
84-89 (1932).
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). As a practical

10. See id.; see also DEL. CODE
matter, most boards of directors of large corporations delegate their authority
for managing the daily minutiae of the corporation to officers, pursuant to the
authority to delegate given to directors in DGCL § 141(a) (or the equivalent in
the statutory code for the state in which the corporation is incorporated).
Throughout this Article, Delaware will be used as the primary state of
reference for purposes of statutory analysis or close examination of case law,
given that Delaware is home to 60 percent of the Fortune 500 and 50 percent of
all publicly traded companies in the United States. See Delaware Division of
Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml (last visited Mar. 16,
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business and affairs of the corporation.11 While this
separation is beneficial for the passive investor, this
separation between the managers and the owners raises a
vexing issue: How should one constituency manage the
assets owned by a different constituency? To wit, how
should the directors manage a business owned by
shareholders? 12 Because corporations do not have the unity
of ownership and control exhibited in a sole proprietorship,
where an owner herself manages the business that she
owns, some minimum behavioral standards for directors are
needed to ensure that corporate directors devote the same
attention and effort to the corporation, owned by the

2007).
Much has been written about the ramifications of Delaware's promanagement statutory and judicial efforts to encourage corporations to
incorporate in Delaware, and the debate continues among academics as to
whether Delaware's efforts and the responsive efforts of other states have led to
a "race to the bottom" in terms of corporate management deference and
protection. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRONSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW 14 n.52 (1999) (citing William Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon [sic] Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)); accord Liggett
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-58 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally 2005
Annual
Report:
Delaware
Department
of State,
Department
of
Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf (last
visited
Mar. 16, 2007) (showing statistics and discussing the State's efforts to increase
the number of corporations incorporated in Delaware).
While I find the "race to the bottom" discussion fascinating, it is beyond the
scope of this Article. I will note, however, that I am sympathetic to Professor
Lawrence Mitchell's position: "The laxity of Delaware law, or its significance,
has long been a subject of dispute. With such shameful and disingenuous
opinions as In re Caremark Intl, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) and Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997), I believe the matter can no longer be in
dispute." Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of
Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 n.2 (2003). Professor Mitchell
reflects what was so poetically penned by other corporate law scholars almost a
decade before regarding the state of Delaware corporate jurisprudence:
"Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior case law is like watching
clouds. They seem, at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, even to
resemble something familiar. But you know that whatever shapes you think
you see can vanish in a puff of wind." Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M.
Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified
Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAw. 1593, 1626 (1994).
11. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (2001); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
12. Useful discussions of the issues underpinning this question are
contained in STEVEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS §§ 5.25.3, at 194-95 (2002).
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shareholders, that the directors would devote to a business
owned solely by themselves. 13 It is in the shareholders' best
interests for directors to take well-considered risks, 14 but
directors need to be held to at least some behavioral
standards. How should the directors manage, and how
should the directors' actions be judged? These questions are
answered by evaluating a director's "fiduciary duties."
Directors hold a fiduciary position within the
corporation (either characterized as an agent or trustee
role), 15 and directors are obligated to act with a primary
13. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (2004) (discussing the two competing views
among academics as to which constituency's interests should prevail). The
discussion of whether directors actually prioritize shareholder interests as
opposed to the directors' own interests has been the fodder for much debate.
Some academics embrace the "shareholder primacy model" of corporate
governance, and others focus on the "director primacy model" of corporate
discussion. For purposes of this discussion, neither perspective alters the fact
that directors are inarguably fiduciaries for something (the corporation) or
someone (the shareholders) else.
14. This discussion of the benefits to investors of their corporate
management's willingness to take calculated risks that the shareholder can
arguably diversify away is summarized nicely by Judge Winter in Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982):
Since shareholders can and do select among investments partly on the
basis of management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a
certain voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business
decisions. . . . The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and
to confront uncertainty . . . [and] because profit often corresponds to

the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that
the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.
Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial
losses, while other alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less
potential profit. Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by
diversifying their holdings.
15. The question of what specific label is appropriate for directors as
fiduciaries-whether agent, trustee, or bailiff-is a challenging question to
answer. Traditionally, corporate officers and directors have been viewed as
agents. See, e.g., FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 34
(1889) ("[O]nly through the employment of agents [can] the executive functions
of the corporation . . . be exercised."); FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 104 (1903) ("[A] corporation . . . can act only

through the intervention of agents."); John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Principlesand Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE

OF BUSINESS 1, 2 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) ("The
corporate executive . . . is an agent for the shareholders."). However, some
scholars argue that officers and directors cannot be agents because the
relationship between the director and the shareholder (the "agent" and the
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"principal," as it were) is not a product of contract, as it would be in the
traditional agency relationship. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS,
supra, at 55, 56 ("[D]irectors are not agents of the corporation but are sui
generis . . . neither [are] directors . . . agents of the stockholders.") (italicization
added). Dean Clark seems to view the relationship between directors and the
corporation or directors and the stockholders as one of both contract and statute
as opposed to agency, but he seems unable to pin down a useful characterization
of the relationship, if not an "agency" relationship. See id. at 56-59. I suppose
the historical treatment of the manager/corporate relationship as one of agency
can be partially reconciled with Dean Clark's position by viewing the manager
and corporation/stockholder relationship as one of implied contract and,
therefore, agency, as was done in Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Foote, 79 Ill. 361,
368-69 (1875):
[I]t must be presumed that each person, in becoming a member of the
company, impliedly consents that it shall be represented by such
officers and agents as are reasonably necessary for the transaction of
its business, and that they shall possess the powers and perform the
duties ordinarily possessed and performed by such officers and agents.
In any event, the characterization of the relationship between a corporation
and its managers ("managers" meaning both directors and officers) as an
agency relationship has a long history. See 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 575, at 547 (2d ed. 1886) ("Corporations
almost invariably act through agents."). Indeed, while a corporation is a legal
entity, able to contract and engage in other legal acts on its behalf, "[t]here are
few acts which a corporation aggregate can possibly perform without the
intervention of an agency of some kind." Id.
However, case law also indicates that the director-shareholder-corporation
relationship involves both a trust relationship and an agency relationship:
"[T]he ordinary rules of law relating to an agent are applicable in considering
the acts of a board of directors in behalf of a corporation when dealing with
third persons - . . [whereas] [t]he relation of the directors to the stockholders is
essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust." People ex rel. Manice v. Powell,
94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (italicization added). Yet the Restatement of
Trusts notes that:
There are many similarities and also differences in the roles and duties
of trustees and those of corporate officers or directors, partners of
various types of partnerships, and member-managers of limitedliability companies.
For example, trustees and corporate officers and directors, as
fiduciaries, manage the affairs, respectively, of the trust or the
corporation for the benefit of the beneficiaries or the shareholders.
Corporate officers and directors, however, do not hold title to the
property of the corporation and therefore are not trustees; accordingly
their fiduciary duties are not within the scope of this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. g (2003).

Thus, there are at least three ways to characterize the fiduciary relationship
between a director and stockholders: pure agency (director is an agent,
stockholder is the principal); pure trust (the director is a trustee with respect to
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fidelity to their beneficiary (the corporation or the
shareholders). 16 These fiduciary obligations are broken
down into two specific fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care. 17 Judging the acts of corporate
directors, then, requires a specific assessment of whether8
the directors complied with these fiduciary obligations.'
the shareholder, who is the principal); and a combination of both (director is an
agent with respect to the corporation as principal, and the director is a trustee
with respect to his shareholders). Where does this ambiguity leave us? Nowhere
of great import, as it is undisputed that directors hold some sort of fiduciary
relationship with respect to their corporation and its shareholders. Moreover,
the obligations of agents and trustees overlap to a large degree, such that the
distinction in title is often of limited import. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TRUSTS § 5 cmt. e (2003) ("Although an agent is not a trustee and is subject to
rules of the law of agency, many of the same legal principles that are applied to
trustees may be applied to agents .

. .

."). A more complete discussion of this

interesting issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
16. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, § 6.2, at 242-43.
17. The two fiduciary duties of directors have historically been the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825
A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003). Interestingly, however, over the past several
years, the Delaware Supreme Court has, on occasion, referred to the fiduciary
duties as a "triad," including the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith. See
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("The directors of
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care,
loyalty, and good faith."). This third duty-the duty of good faith-appears to
have become a "duty" (which I take to mean something beyond merely an
obligation, and something for which independent recourse exists) essentially
overnight. Compare Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90, and Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referring to "the triads of [a
directors'] fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care"), with Paramount
Commc'n Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) ('[T]he
directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and
loyalty."' (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989))), and Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument, 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del.
1989) ("Eight of Fairchild's nine directors are charged with breach of their
fiduciary duties of good faith and due care .. ").The Delaware Supreme Court
has never explained where they pulled this third duty from, and, indeed, more
than one jurist on the Delaware Chancery Court has questioned the appearance
of this new "duty." In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has not been
consistent in including this duty of good faith in its recitations of a director's
fiduciary duties. While I certainly agree that directors have the obligation to act
in good faith, the obligation to act in good faith has historically been subsumed
both in the duty of care and the duty of loyalty as opposed to being a standalone duty. See Continuing Creditors' Comm. of Star Telecomm. Inc. v.
Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 460 n.9 (D. Del. 2004) ("Although the Plaintiff
also invokes the duty of good faith as separate from the duty of loyalty,
Delaware case law states that the two duties are identical.").
18. For purposes of this Article, I am ignoring the duty of loyalty. Professor
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Absent breaches of either fiduciary duty, our directors have
fulfilled their fiduciary obligations. Absent a breach of
either duty, our directors have managed the shareholders'
assets as the law requires.
A. The Basics of the Duty of Care
A director's fiduciary duty of care obligates the director,
when managing corporate affairs, "to use that amount of
care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances." 19 This standard of conduct-the
care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances-is clearly very generous to
directors, as it, by its terms, requires nothing more than the
normal level of care a person would use in his business. The
standard of review when a director is alleged to have failed
to meet the standard of conduct is even more generous,
however. 20 As discussed below, when a duty of care breach
Lyman Johnson, however, makes a convincing argument that the duty of care
issues that come up in cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 585 (Del.
1985), and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 286, could also be
addressed as duty of loyalty issues. Are you being loyal, Professor Johnson
would ask, and are you being faithful, when you (the director) pay little
attention to the compensation of senior executives (for example)? In a more
user-friendly hypothetical, would we call a friend, whom we have authorized to
use our money, to pay our dog sitter while we are on vacation "loyal" if that
friend gave the dog sitter a $200 tip just because the dog sitter showed up every
day (like she was obligated to do anyway)? No. Our friend was not loyal; she
was frittering away our money needlessly. If we view "loyal" conduct in the
director context the way we view "loyal" conduct in real life-faithful conduct
for the benefit of the one we are loyal to-then many "duty of care" fact patterns
could just as well be viewed as "duty of care" cases. See Lyman Johnson, After
Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 27
(2003); see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 7 (discussing fiduciary duties in
the context of the role that corporate officers and directors have played in recent
corporate scandals).
19. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963);
accord 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 109 (5th ed. 1998) ("[T]he duty of care requires
that directors exercise the care that a person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances."). Some states (such as New York and California)
have codified the standard of conduct for directors, while other states (such as
Delaware) have no such statutory provisions. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West
2006); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2001). See generally 1 AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (1994).

20. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 544-45 (8th ed. 2000) ("On their face, the duties of directors are
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is alleged, the director's action at issue is initially presumed
to be beyond judicial review and within the protections of
the business judgment rule, subject to be set aside only if it
is irrational. 21 Only in the very rare case when this
will a
business judgment rule presumption is rebutted 22
director's actions be subject to more stringent review.
B. The Standardof Review and the Business Judgment
Rule
When reviewing an alleged breach of a director's duty of
care, a court will first afford the directors the protections of
the business judgment rule. 23 The business judgment rule is
a tool of judicial restraint, justified by the belief that courts
are ill-equipped to second-guess the business decisions
made by directors who are acting in good faith. 24 The
business judgment rule operates as a protective
presumption, based on the assumption that the directors of
a corporation "acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action [at issue] was in the best
interests of the company. ' 25 When a shareholder alleges
that a director breached his duty of care, the director is
initially assumed to be within the protections of this
fairly demanding, insofar as they are measured by reasonability. In practice,
however, the standards of review applied to the performance of these duties are
less stringent than the standards of conduct on which the duties are based.").
Judge Winter of the Second Circuit similarly went so far as to admit in an
opinion:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be
liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem
agreed that such a statement is misleading ....

[A] corporate officer

who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic conditions, consumer
tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable
for damages suffered by the corporation.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
21. See EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 546.

22. See id.
23. See id. at 545.
24. See E. Norman Veasey, Access to Justice: The
Lawyers, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2003).
25. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v.
Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch. 1924)), overruled by Brehm
(Del. 2000) (overruling on other grounds).

Social Responsibility of
(citing Kaplan v. Centex
Pittsburgh Oil Refinery
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
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business judgment rule presumption, and the reviewing
court will only find that the director breached his duty of
care if the actions of the director under attack are
irrational, attributable to no reason of which a rational
not
person would conceive. 26 If the director's actions are
27
irrational, the director did not breach his duty of care.

26. See id. at 812; see also EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 545.
27. See EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 545. The business judgment rule
presumption, with its very deferential "irrationality" standard of review, serves
a sound policy goal: it encourages directors to exercise their discretion in
making decisions based on then-existing facts without fear of being secondguessed. See id. at 547-48. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 13 (discussing
the two competing views among academics as to which constituency's interests
shall prevail). A lenient measure of post hoc review protects against hindsight
bias:
As a result of a systematic defect in cognition known as the hindsight
bias, however, under a reasonableness standard of review fact-finders
might too often erroneously treat decisions that turned out badly as
bad decisions, and unfairly hold directors liable for such decisions.
Experimental psychology has shown that in hindsight people
consistently exaggerate the ease with which outcomes could have been
anticipated in foresight.
EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 547-48; see Joy v. North, 682 F.2d 880, 886 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding
a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years
"). A court will not, therefore, second-guess a decision made by a
later ....
director that, in hindsight, was merely wrong, a mistake, or an unfortunate
choice made when faced with multiple options. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19,
at 109. Although the relatively recent Delaware case of Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d at 805, is usually cited to support this deference, this concept is actually
not a modern one. See, e.g., MECHEM, supra note 15, § 502, at 337-38 ("The law
does not presume negligence on the part of the agent. On the other hand, it
presumes that the agent has done his duty, until the contrary appears, and the
burden of proof is upon him who alleges a misfeasance, to establish it.").
This deference to directors is sensible, because we want directors to make
somewhat "risky" decisions, given that "potential profit often corresponds to the
potential risk." See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (discussing the risk and reward
calculus that weighs in favor of directors sometimes making riskier decisions to
achieve greater benefits for the shareholders because shareholders can diversify
away a corporation's risk); see also EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 540-44; Dennis
J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw. 27, 32 (1981). Shareholders,
knowing of this risk-reward calculus, can either elect not to buy stock, given
that the market offers an array of other investment vehicles, or shareholders
can mitigate the risk inherent in any given investment by diversifying their
investment portfolio and holding many different stocks in disparate industries.
See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885-86. This diversification or voluntary decision to invest
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If the plaintiff can show that any of the four factual
assumptions underpinning the business judgment rule are
lacking, however, the protective presumption of the
28
business judgment rule will be stripped from the director.
The director's conduct will then be reviewed under a more
demanding fairness and reasonableness standard of
review, 29 as opposed to an irrationality standard of review,
and the director will have the burden of proving that she
acted in a procedurally fair manner and reached a
substantively fair result. 30 If she cannot establish the
in stock with an understanding of the general volatility of the market frees the
directors of each individual corporation to more broadly make appropriately
risky decisions. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 233-35 (8th ed.
2002); see also EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 540-42 (quoting KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra). The Second Circuit in Joy v.North, 692 F.2d at 886, went so far as to
say that "[g]iven mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment,
courts need not bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders
who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying." A presumption of
judicial abstention from substantive review of directors' decisions encourages
directors to make these decisions as quickly as business imperatives require
without the hamstring of liability fears. EISENBERG, supranote 20, at 540-44.
28. As noted above, the four factual assumptions identified in Aronson v.
Lewis as justifying the business judgment rule presumption are (1) a decision
having been made, (2) after the directors became reasonably informed about the
matter at issue, and (3) the directors acted in good faith, (4) without any selfinterest or conflict. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; accord In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that the business
judgment presumption is based on the assumption that "the decision made was
the product of a process that was either deliberately considered in good faith or
was otherwise rational"); see also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 110;
EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 545.
29. See EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 545-46; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812.
30. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 112 n.20; EISENBERG, supra note 20,
at 545-46 (discussing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993));
see also McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1028 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("If the director
defendants had disabling conflicts of interest or acted in bad faith . . .they
would have to prove the fairness of the transaction.").
Given that Professor Eisenberg cites the Cede case to support his position
that the standard of review regarding a duty of care claim is based on
irrationality when a director is outside the protections of the business judgment
rule, let me use this opportunity to note that the Cede case is the typical
Delaware case I was thinking of in my introduction when I noted that the
Delaware courts often seem befuddled. See supra note 10. In the Cede opinion,
the court states that "the breach of the duty of care ... is sufficient to rebut the
business judgment rule." Cede, 634 A.2d at 371. The court goes on to say that
"[a] breach of either the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rebuts the
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presumption" of the business judgment rule. Id. What does that mean?
It is my view (and I thought that of Professor Eisenberg, based on page 545
of his text) that the reverse of what the Cede court said is true. That is to say, if
the business judgment rule is rebutted, the court will review an alleged duty of
care claim on a "fairness and reasonableness" standard. If the claim is not fair
and reasonable, the directors will be liable for breaching their duty of care. The
Cede court cites the Van Gorkom opinion to support its backward position. See
Cede, 634 A.2d at 368 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del.
1985)). The Cede court cites the final page of the majority opinion in Van
Gorkom, wherein that court notes:
[T]he directors of Trans Union breached their fiduciary duty to their
stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to
recommend the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all
material information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider
important in deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. I do not read this language to say, as the Cede
court suggests, that a breach of the duty of care rebuts the business judgment
rule presumption. Rather, I read this language-the above language quoted
from page 893 of the Van Gorkom opinion-to say, if anything, the opposite: the
failure to satisfy the third of the business judgment rule prerequisites
(becoming reasonably informed) leads to a breach of the duty of care.
Of course, the Van Gorkom opinion is no model of clarity itself. The above
quoted language from Van Gorkom would have been made more clear (and
thereby useful as precedent) and more representative of the law if it read as
follows:
The Trans Union directors removed themselves from the generous
protections of the business judgment rule by being grossly negligent in
their efforts to become informed. By failing to become informed about
all material reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision
to recommend the Pritzker merger, thereby being grossly negligent and
relinquishing the presumption's protection, the director's alleged
breach of the duty of care will be reviewed against a reasonable and
fairness standard. And we conclude that the directors of Trans Union
did not meet this standard, and thereby breached their duty of care,
when they (1) failed to inform themselves of all information reasonably
available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the
Pritzker merger; and (2) failed to disclose all material information such
as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding
whether to approve the Pritzker offer. Such failings are neither fair nor
reasonable.
Mind you, the Van Gorkom opinion does not include the second half of my
duty of care calculus: the opinion does not say "by being grossly negligent in
their efforts to become informed" and thereby forfeiting the business judgment
rule presumption, "the director's alleged breach of the duty of care will be
reviewed against a reasonable and fairness standard." The opinion says nothing
of that at all. Rather, by only its actual language, the court seems to say that
once the business judgment rule presumption is rebutted, the directors are
liable for breaching their duty of care. Yet, that cannot be. It seems to me that
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reasonableness and fairness of her decision, her actions will
be found to have violated her duty of care.
The "power" of the business judgment rule presumption
then can only be undercut if a complaining shareholder can
show one of three things:
(1) The director was conflicted;
(2) The director did not act in good faith; or
(3) The director was grossly negligent in becoming
informed. 31
It is the good faith option that is of import in this
Article.
C. Legislative Limits on a Director'sDuty of Care Liability
Exposure
As if the very generous standard of conduct and the

the value of a presumption is to shift the burden off of the director to allow him
to be free of the fear of always being second-guessed with hindsight. Once the
burden is shifted back to the defendant, however, this now-burdened party can
still prove he is not liable (by establishing fairness and reasonableness), as
opposed to immediately being held liable. That is the point of burdens and
burden-shifting; they deal with proof.
Based on the lengthy discussion in the Van Gorkom opinion of the process
followed by the Trans Union directors both in approving the merger price and
reviewing and approving the merger agreement, I think we can safely conclude
that the court was reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of the process. See
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-89. That is to say, on the unique facts of this case,
the "informed" element of the business judgment rule substantially overlapped
with the later "fair and reasonable" standard of review. The same Trans Union
director conduct was relevant to both inquiries.
As well, footnote 13 of the Van Gorkom opinion cites and quotes cases that
basically lay out the fair and reasonable test's criteria (whether the board
passed an "unintelligent and unadvised judgment" and whether the board acted
"without the bounds of reason and recklessly"). Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873
n.13.
31. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812:
[T]o invoke the [business judgment] rule's protection directors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all
material information reasonably available to them. Having become so
informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of
their duties. While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to
describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that
under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence.
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business judgment rule presumption described above were
not protection enough for a director against a claim that she
breached her duty of care, most states also offer a statutory
limit on a director's personal liability for breaching her duty
of care. Specifically, most states have a section in their
corporate code that permits a corporation to include in its
charter a provision that prohibits (or dramatically limits)
shareholder lawsuits against directors in which the
shareholders seek money damages. 32 For example, DGCL §
102(b)(7) provides that a corporation can include in its
certificate of incorporation:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary

32. Most states in the union have a statutory provision limiting a director's
personal liability for duty of care breaches. See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-2.02(b)(3)
(1999) (adopted in 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (2006) (adopted in
1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-202(B)(1) (2007) (adopted in 1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-27-202(b)(3) (2001) (adopted in 1987); CAL. CORP CODE § 204(a)(10)
(West 2007) (adopted in 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-108-402(1)-(2) (West
2006) (adopted in 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-636(b)(4)-(5) (West 2005)
(adopted in 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (adopted in 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. §14-2-202(b)(4) (2003) (adopted in 1988); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 301-202(2)(d) (2006) (adopted in 1997); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.10 (2005) (adopted
in 1994); IOWA CODE § 490.832 (2007) (adopted in 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 176002(b)(8) (1995) (adopted in 1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020
(LexisNexis 2003) (adopted in 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §12:24(C)(4) (1994)
(adopted in 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 202(2)(D) (2004) (adopted in
2001); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (LexisNexis
1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-418(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (adopted
in 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, §13 (2006) (adopted in 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §450.1209 (2006) (adopted in 1987); MINN. STAT. § 300.64 (2006) (adopted
in 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-4-2.02 (2006) (adopted in 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. §
351.055 (2006) (adopted in 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §35-2-213(2)(e) (2005)
(adopted in 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2018(2)(d) (1997) (adopted in 1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:2.02 (2005) (adopted in 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:2-7(3) (West 2003) (adopted in 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)
(McKinney 2003) (adopted in 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2006)
(adopted in 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §10-19.1-50(5) (2005) (adopted in 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1006(B)(7) (West 1998) (adopted in 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (2005) (adopted in 1987); R.I. GEN LAWS § 7-1.2-202(b)(3)
(Supp. 2006) (adopted in 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-2-58.8 (2000) (adopted
in 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-12-102(a)(3) (2002) (adopted in 1987); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302, § 7.06(B) (2003) (adopted in 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. §16-10a-841 (2005) (adopted in 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §2.02(b)(4)
(1997) (adopted in 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (2006) (adopted in
1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.320 (1994) (adopted in 1989); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 31D-2-202(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006) (adopted in 2002); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-16-202(b)(iv) (2005) (adopted in 1989).
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damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that
such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any
transaction
from which the director derived an improper personal
33
benefit.

This provision of the Delaware code allows a business
that is incorporated in Delaware to clearly insulate its
directors against personal liability to their shareholders for
money damages for duty of care breaches. 34 A certificate of
incorporation provision adopted pursuant to DGCL §
102(b)(7)

operates

as

an

affirmative

defense. 35

If

a

stockholder plaintiff brings a lawsuit seeking monetary
damages against a defendant director based on an alleged
duty of care breach, 36 the director can point to the
exculpatory charter provision as his affirmative defense. 37 If

33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). A few states offer statutory
duty of care protection that differs slightly from Delaware's protection, but the
differing statutes still serve to limit the personal liability exposure of the
directors. For example, Virginia's statutory insulation offers directors protection
via a monetary liability cap. The Virginia code limits the recoverable damages
that can be garnered from any one director in any proceeding brought by, or in
the right of, the corporation or its shareholders to the lesser of the monetary cap
specified in the articles of incorporation or shareholder-approved by-laws, or the
greater of $100,000 or the cash compensation received by the director from the
corporation over the twelve months prior to the actions alleged to be fiduciary
violations. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (2006).
34. I say that DGCL § 102(b)(7) allows corporations "to clearly" insulate
their directors against liability, because the reality is that the business
judgment rule presumption as discussed in Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812, does, in
effect, exactly the same thing as § 102(b)(7). See Emerald Partners v. Berlin,
787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) ("The statutory enactment of Section 102(b)(7) was a
logical corollary to the common law principles of the business judgment rule.").
Apparently corporate directors wanted even more assurances than the business
judgment rule presumption offered.
35. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001) (quoting
Emerald Partners,726 A.2d at 1223).
36. DGCL § 102(b)(7) does not prohibit a plaintiff stockholder from suing a
director to seek injunctive relief.
37. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092-93. A defendant director can raise a
DGCL § 102(b)(7) defense "on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (with or without
the filing of an answer), a motion for judgment on the pleadings (after filing an
answer), or a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment)
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the plaintiff has not pleaded that the conduct at issue falls
within one of the exceptions specified in DGCL § 102(b)(7)(a) the duty of loyalty was breached in addition to the duty
of care; (b) the director did not act in good faith or the
director engaged in willful misconduct; or (c) the director
was conflicted-the director defendant will be immune from
shareholder 38suit for monetary damages for breaching his
duty of care.
D. The Unimportanceof Being Earnest
The big picture, then, when we put together all the
pieces of a duty of care analysis, looks bleak from a
stockholder's perspective. If a stockholder tries to sue a
director for doing something "wrong," and the director is not
conflicted such that the duty of loyalty is implicated, the
shareholder's only other option is to draft a complaint based
on a duty of care breach. 39 But if the stockholder does try to
sue a director for breaching his duty of care, the stockholder
immediately runs into the business judgment rule brick
wall. 40 The director is afforded the deference of the business
rule presumption from the get-go. Under the business
judgment rule presumption, the stockholder can only get
past a defendant's motion to dismiss if she can plead facts
indicating that the 41director's action was irrationalbasically inexplicable.
The only other way a stockholder can keep herself in
the courtroom at that juncture is to identify facts that will
justify removing the director from the protection of the
business judgment rule. 42 To do this, the shareholder must
under Rule 56 after an answer, with or without supporting affidavits." Id. at
1092 (citations omitted); accordEmerald Partners,787 A.2d at 91 n.35.
38. See Emerald Partners,787 A.2d at 91-92; E. Norman Veasey, Musings
on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns,

Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1010-11 (2003).
39. Again, recall that I do not support the position taken by some that
directors have three fiduciary duties, this new "duty of good faith" being the
third. See supra note 17.
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. I have not come across a case where a defendant failed an irrationality
analysis.
42. See supra note 28.
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show that one of the four factual prerequisites to the
business judgment rule presumption's protection is missing.
The prerequisites that are usually implicated in this
backward calculus are the obligation to act on an informed
basis and the obligation to act in good faith. 43 If the plaintiff
can show that the director was grossly negligent in his
attempt to become informed or did not act in good faith, the
director is stripped of the business judgment rule
presumption's protection (and its absurdly generous
irrationality standard of review), and the standard of
review becomes one of reasonableness and fairness.
However, even if a shareholder plaintiff overcomes the
business judgment rule presumption, and even if a
shareholder can show that the director did not act in a
reasonable and fair way, such that the director breached his
duty of care, the director is likely to still have further
statutory protection under a charter provision based on
DGCL §102(b)(7), such that the duty of care violation
proved by the plaintiff is essentially irrelevant. 44 The only
way in that situation for a plaintiff stockholder to keep
herself in the courtroom is to prove that the director did not
act in good faith, such that he falls outside of the
protections of the statutory liability limiting provision in
addition to falling outside the protection of the business
judgment rule presumption. 45

43. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
44. Despite my statement in the text acceding to the basic majority view on
what DGCL § 102(b)(7) means, I have long been of the view that DGCL § 102(b)(7)
does not actually insulate against duty of care violations based on a director's
obligation to act in good faith. Phrased differently, as I read Aronson together
with DGCL § 102(b)(7), a stockholder in a corporation with a DGCL § 102(b)(7)
provision in its charter cannot sue for a duty of care violation if the claim is
based on the director's failure to become adequately informed prior to making a
decision. However, I vary from the majority, it seems, in that I read the "good
faith" language in DGCL § 102(b)(7) as leaving room for duty of care claims that
are based on allegations of the absence of good faith, as opposed to allegations
that the directors were grossly negligent in becoming informed.
I have yet to find an academic who mirrors my view. For that reason, for
purposes of this discussion, it is easier, and makes no real difference, to accord
with the majority view.
45. The terms of these statutes usually exclude duty of loyalty breaches, and
intentional violations of the law, both of which are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
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Therefore, the entire duty of care analysis-essentially
the entire discussion about whether a director did his job
46
decently-often boils down to an assessment of good faith.
If a director does a relatively poor job of running the
corporation and is admittedly giving the task a mediocre
effort, the only way that the owner of the corporation (the
stockholder) can hold her director accountable is by
circumventing the business judgment rule presumption's
protection and any statutory protection to prove that the
director did not act in good faith. It is for this reason that,
as discussed in the Introduction, it is important to have a
clear definition of "good faith." The judiciary's and
contemporary academics' lack of consistency and clarity in
the good faith area needs to be addressed before even a
compelling case brought by a sympathetic plaintiff
shareholder has a more than miniscule chance of success in
the courthouse.
46. "Good faith" becomes an issue in at least two contexts when dealing with
director liability for fiduciary failings. First, recall from above, that good faith is
a factual prerequisite to the protections of the business judgment rule
presumption. If a plaintiff can establish that a director did not act in good faith,
the director defendant will not be afforded the protection of the business
judgment rule presumption, and the director's actions will be reviewed under a
reasonableness and fairness analysis. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85,
91 (Del. 2001) ("If the presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted...
the burden shifts to the director defendants to prove to the trier of fact that the
challenged transaction was 'entirely fair' to the shareholder plaintiff.").
Second, the text of most state exculpatory statutes such as DGCL § 102(b)(7)
does not protect directors from personal liability for acts taken "not in good
faith." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). A corporation can include in its
certificate of incorporation "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty," but such provision cannot eliminate or
limit a director's liability "for acts or omissions not in good faith." Id.
In addition, some would maintain that a director's duty of loyalty is
breached if the director fails to act in good faith, such that a good faith
assessment is relevant for the review of an alleged duty of loyalty claim. See In
re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(noting that the Delaware Supreme Court has "equate[d] good faith with
loyalty"). Some would also argue that good faith is its own independent
fiduciary duty, see supra note 17, and some take the position that good faith is
an ephemeral concept binding directors in all that they do. See David
Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware CorporateFiduciary Law:
A ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 513 (2004). For purposes of
this Article, I will focus on only the first two situations in which good faith
becomes relevant, as I am not convinced of the validity of the three other
invocations of the "good faith" language.
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II. THE MECHANICS OF DEFINING GOOD FAITH
There is no generally-accepted, well-reasoned definition
of "good faith" in the director liability context. 47 Neither
common law nor recent scholarship offers a definition that
is both generally transferable to the director liability
context and agreeable, well-reasoned, and relatively
precise. 48 Part of the reason why the good faith landscape is
barren of a good faith definition is attributable to the
nature of the phrase-"good faith" has been described as
47. This "good faith" obligation imposed on directors is nothing new, as
fiduciaries have always been obligated to act in good faith, and directors qua
fiduciaries are no exception. For this reason, it is interesting that the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet defined "good faith" in the context of director
liability, given the reputation of the Court to be the ultimate arbiter of
corporate law. To be fair, I have found no evidence that the Delaware Supreme
Court has been directly asked to define good faith. Indeed, in the recent Disney
shareholder litigation where the issue of whether the directors acted in good
faith was crucial, plaintiff-appellant's counsel did not propose an affirmative
definition of good faith even one time. See Transcript of Oral Argument, In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (No. 411) (on file with
author). The fact, then, that no such firmly rooted definition of good faith exists
in the director liability context affords me the luxury to work through a
principled calculus below to generate a sensible, useful definition of good faith.
48. That being said, much has recently been published regarding a director's
good faith obligation. In addition to the many law review articles cited
throughout this Article, note also: Robert Baker, In Re Walt Disney: What It
Means to the Definition of Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of
Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 261 (2004); Christopher M.
Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director
Liability in CorporateLaw, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); Tara L. Dunn,
The Developing Theory of Good Faith in DirectorConduct: Are Delaware Courts
Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 531 (2005); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the
Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial
Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398 (2007); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the
Breakdown of the Board: PromotingAccountability in Corporate Governance, 92
IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006); Janet E. Kerr, Developments in CorporateGovernance:
The Duty of Good Faith and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1037 (2006); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Fiduciary Duties and Standards of
Review in the Context of Going Private Transactions, 1597 PRAC. L. INST. CORP.
147 (2007); Matthew R. Berry, Note, Does Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) Protect
Reckless Directors From Personal Liability? Only If Delaware Courts Act in
Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004); David H. Cook, Comment, The
Emergence of Delaware's Good Faith Fiduciary Duty: In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DuQ. L. REV. 91 (2004);
Jaclyn J. Janssen, Note, In Re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation:
Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to
Enhance DirectorAccountability, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1573 (2004).
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"loose and amorphous." 49 In addition, part of the reason
why the phrase "good faith" has no readily identifiable
definition in the director liability realm is likely because,
until late, good faith has not been outcome determinative in
any director liability litigation. 50 Nobody seems to have paid
careful attention to what good faith means in the director
liability context because nobody has needed to care until
recently. 51 There was no reason to go out and define good
faith if the jurists were not using it to judge directors and if
directors were not leaning on the phrase's definition to
guide their conduct.
Now, however, in the wake of recent scandals and
litigation, good faith is being pulled from the disgruntled
shareholder plaintiffs arsenal as a tool to right the wrongs
of corporate mismanagement. 52 Therefore, it is time to
begin thoughtfully defining the boundaries of a director's
obligation to act in good faith. Without a reasonably welldefined and agreed-upon definition of good faith, directors
will continue to struggle to both meet and stay within the
bounds of their good faith obligation, and it is likely that
directors will become more conservative in situations where
it might have made sense to assume more risk (for purposes
of hopefully earning greater rewards). In addition,
shareholders who are trying to plead that a director did not
49. Friedrich K. Juenger, Listening to Law Professors Talk About Good
Faith: Some Afterthoughts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1995). I am not
sympathetic to the argument that "good faith" is too difficult to define. "[T]he
words in question, 'in good faith' are clear and unambiguous, are words in
common usage, and therefore need not be defined." State v. A.G., 670 S.W.2d
516, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). "'The phrase 'good faith' in common usage has a
well-defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to
describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention
to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or
obligation."' Id. (quoting People v. Nunn, 296 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1956)).
50. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence,55 DUKE L.J. 1, 15-16 (2005) ("The
mystery of good faith has been a part of Delaware law for as long as the
business judgment rule. It has been an express component of the rule at least
since the oft-cited Aronson formulation appeared in 1984 and an explicit part of
the statute [DGCL § 102(b)(7)] since it was amended in 1987. Yet the concept
was unexplored for almost two decades, until the chancery court's development
of good faith jurisprudence in 2003.").
51. See id.
52. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006).
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act in good faith are left guessing about what they have to
plead.
But defining good faith in the director liability context
is, as alluded to before, not simple. In addition to the fact
that good faith is "loose and amorphous" in and of itself, the
stakes are high when defining good faith in the context of
director liability. Too narrow of a definition will mean that
directors can satisfy their obligation to act in good faith
with no more than minimal effort and attention. Certainly
that is not acceptable for a fiduciary who is acting in the
stead of hundreds or thousands of shareholders. Yet too
broad of a definition of good faith will mean that directors
will be fearful of taking the risks needed to achieve great
wealth, and the essence of the business judgment rule and
common law deference to directors will be undermined. It is
unlikely that qualified, experienced people will want to
serve as directors if they are faced with the likelihood of
being second-guessed on every decision.
Adopting wholesale a definition of good faith from an
area of law where the definition of good faith has roughly
been agreed upon is not the solution, because, as we will see
below, most of the definitions are specific to the context,
such that they cannot be easily adopted. Indeed, the unique
fiduciary
relationship
of the
director- shareholdercorporation constituencies confounds even the most wellestablished definition of "good faith" in the arms-length
context (such as, for example, in the commercial law
context, where the definition of "good faith" is generally
agreed upon).
That said, it is certainly worthwhile to look at how
"good faith" is defined in other areas of the law, to see if
there is some common thread to be pulled. While definitions
from some areas of the law, such as the criminal law realm,
are not particularly helpful individually, the definition of
good faith in the trust context (where the trustee is a
fiduciary of the beneficiary), in the agency context (where
there is an agent-principle fiduciary relationship), and in
the insurance context (where we have both a contractual
relationship and a sometimes fiduciary relationship) all
prove useful because their factual contexts line up nicely, as
do their underlying relational ties, with the director
liability realm. In addition, good faith in commercial and
contracts law realms merit a longer look as directors are
under implicit, if not explicit, contractual obligations to the
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corporation that they serve. Therefore, the definitions of
good faith as the term is used in the context of a fiduciary
53
relationship, when examined along with the dictionary
and tempered with a good dose of common sense, ultimately
prove most helpful as demonstrated below, in constructing
a sensible, defensible, and useful definition of "good faith"
in the director conduct context.
A. The Dictionary
Black's Law Dictionary defines good faith as: "A state of
mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2)
faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given
trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to
54
seek unconscionable advantage.-Also termed bona ides."
Analyzing whether a director acted with a lack of good
faith in violation of the business judgment rule or a
§ 102(b)(7) charter provision would be easy if we simply
used Black's good faith definition. The jurist attempting to
assess a director's alleged good faith violation would line up
a director's conduct with whichever phrase (e.g., "(1)," "(2),"
"(3)," or "(4)") from the definition of good faith that was
most appropriate with respect to the facts of the case (likely
"faithfulness to one's duty or obligation") and analyze
whether the acts at issue fit within the definition of "good
faith."55 Was a director who did not inquire further into
whether an executive's pay package was justifiably at the
top of the pay range among his peers acting with

53. See generally Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven
Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionariesat the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 829 (2005).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (7th ed. 1999). However, beneath the
definition is a paragraph of text that seems to imply that good faith is not so
easily defined. The paragraph quotes the Second Restatement of Contracts in
which it is noted that '[t]he phrase 'good faith' is used in a variety of contexts,
and its meaning varies somewhat with the context."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981)).
55. Although the language in the definition refers to "[a] state of mind," see
supra text accompanying note 54, it seems that courts would have to view the
acts at issue objectively, as opposed to using the subjective viewpoint of the
director under fire, if good faith is going to have any value in guiding a
director's fulfillment of his fiduciary duties.
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"faithfulness to [his] duty or obligation" as a director? 56
Notwithstanding the fact that the reference to the
dictionary is legitimate in defining terms for legal
purposes, 57 for those who oppose resort to the dictionary
alone (or at least without considering in full other options),
the survey below of the common law definitions of "good
faith" in other contexts and a specific analysis of the
interpretation of good faith in the agency, trustee, and
insurance contexts all support and further shape the
definition of good faith provided in Black's.
B. Existing Good FaithDefinitions from Statutes and
Common Law
The definition of good faith varies by context. While
good faith has a well-defined meaning in some areas of the
law, the definition is less clear in other areas of the law,
where courts take more of a "we know it when we see it"
approach. 58 It is worthwhile to broadly review the
definitions of "good faith" from other areas of the law for
purposes of trying to assess what common ground, if any,
exists within definitions. As we will see below, there is some
overlap among definitions.
Our review will ultimately prove that the factual and
legal aspects of a director's role preclude the mere copying
of a good faith definition from a non-fiduciary context to the
director liability context. Reviewing the definitions in other
areas is not a wasted effort, however, because it gives us a

56. These facts represent a generalization of the facts implicated in the
recent Disney director litigation related to the hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz
as Disney President. See infra Part II.B.4.
57. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874
(1999) (determining the plain meaning of the word "coal" by consulting a
dictionary); State v. Bradford, 368 So. 2d 317, 325 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)
(DeCarlo, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Nunn, 296 P.2d at 818) (citing both
Words and Phrases and Bouvier's Law Dictionary)). See generally John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001)

(discussing the propriety of reading statutes in a manner true to the words
within the statute).
58. "The term 'good faith' is not easily defined and the requirement is not
capable of pragmatic and mechanical application. In the last analysis it is the
same as pornography, one cannot define it but will readily recognize it when
one sees it." In re Noll, 172 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1994) (citing Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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sense of the commonality of purpose of the phrase "good
faith" in other areas of the law.
1. Survey of Good Faith in Other Areas of the Law.
Certain themes recur when defining good faith in various
areas of the law. In the criminal context, "honesty of
purpose, freedom from the intention to defraud, and . . .
being faithful to one's59 duty or obligation" appear often as
"good faith" themes.
When dealing with the unlawful
prescription of narcotics, for example, one must have good
intentions6 0 and make "an honest endeavor to carry on
[one's] profession. ' 61 In property disputes, good faith
includes an "honest and reasonable belief' with no
knowledge or intent otherwise. 62 Other contexts demand of
a good faith actor that he "[act] sincerely and with a belief
he is doing right";63 form honest beliefs after conducting a
reasonable inquiry;6 4 make decisions "well grounded in fact
and . . . warranted . . . by reasonable grounds"; 65 and
provide "fair and full disclosure. '66 In the bargaining arena,
good faith is defined by an "honest purpose" 67 and "sincere

59. State v. A.G., 670 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting People v.
Nunn, 296 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1956) (defining "good faith" in a statute
criminalizing the unlawful sale of narcotics by physicians)).
60. See Bradford, 368 So.2d at 325 (quoting Smith v. State, 13 N.E.2d 562,
565 (Ind. 1938)) (defining "good faith" in a statute criminalizing the unlawful
sale of narcotics by physicians).
61. Id. (quoting State v. Weeks, 335 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1976) (reversing
prior decision holding doctor guilty of selling narcotic drugs) (internal citations
omitted)).
62. Ault v. State, 668 P.2d 951, 956 (Alaska 1984) (defining a good faith
purchaser of property); accord Estate of Skvorak v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 89
P.3d 856, 861 (Idaho 2004) (defining the good faith purchaser of property);
Beard v. Dansty, 2 S.W. 701, 702 (Ark. 1886) (defining good faith belief of
ownership in a land dispute).
63. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (defining "good faith"
regarding the immunity standard in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against school
administrators).
64. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-7-80 (2000) (defining "good faith" in the context
of abusive litigation).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Shapiro, 43 F. Supp. 927, 929 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (defining
good faith required of aliens seeking naturalization).
67. In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing Cap
Santa Vue Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (stating that
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desire" 68 to cooperate and reach an agreement, and the
actor's sincerity must be evidenced by his or her active
participation in the bargaining process. 69 To creditors and
collections agents, good faith requires "that a party justify
its action[s]," 70 "honesty in fact [and] in conduct," 71 and
"diligent and honest" discovery efforts. 72 Treaty signatories
must have the "intent of faithful performance" 73 and must
adhere to their commitments. 74 Finally, good faith in
various federal statutory schemes requires reasonable
attempts at compliance. 7 5 In summary, good faith requires
honest, faithful, sincere, fair, and reasonable intent and
conduct.

2. Good Faith in the Fiduciary Context. "Good faith" as
defined in the fiduciary context-in the context of agents,
trustees, and insurers in particular-merits its own
discussion because good faith requires more of actors in
these contexts than with respect to actors in most other
contexts. 76 In addition, good faith in the fiduciary context is
more goal-specific than is good faith in other contexts. As
we will see below, good faith in the fiduciary context has as
its goal an act "in the best interests" of the person whom
debtor must act in good faith in an attempt to reach an agreement).
68. Serv. Employees Int'l Local Union 316 v. State Educ. Labor Relations
Bd., 505 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (describing good faith bargaining in
an unfair labor practice dispute).
69. W. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526, 538 (Conn. 1972)
(describing board of education's duty to negotiate in good faith).
70. Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1373 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980).
71. IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-201 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining "good faith" in
Indiana transactions).
72. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975) (defining creditor's obligation to investigate in good faith the
security of the indebtedness); accord AquaSource, Inc. v. Wind Dance Farm,
Inc., 833 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ind.Ct. App. 2005); Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d
535, 540 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993).
73. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty
Jurisprudenceand a Call for Resurrection,93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1907-08 (2005).
74. See id. at 1907.
75. See generally WILLIAM R. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.26

(1992 & Supp. 2004).
76. Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith,
FiduciaryDuty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 978-92 (1995)
(discussing a good faith "continuum").
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the fiduciary serves.
a. Agents and Trustees. Agents, trustees,
fiduciaries generally are obligated to act in good faith:

and

It is a fundamental and wholesome provision of the law which
requires a trustee must act in good faith in the administration of
his trust, and that requirement means that he must act honestly
and with finest and undivided loyalty to his trust, not merely with
the standard of honor of the7 7workaday world, but with a punctilio
of honor the most sensitive.

77. Sauvage v. Gallaway, 66 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946); see
Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 754 N.E.2d 184, 188-89 (N.Y. 2001)
(quoting W. Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 360 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 (N.Y. 1977))
(discussing an action by prospective homeowners, who had hired a contractor to
provide pre-construction services for construction of a home on their property,
seeking specific performance of contractor's contract with architect hired to
design home, stating, "fundamental to the principal-agent relationship 'is the
proposition that an [agent] is to be loyal to his [principal] and is prohibited from
acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times
bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his
duties"'); see also In re Marriage of Petrie, 19 P.3d 443, 447 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (quoting Esmieu v. Schrag, 563 P.2d 203, 207 (Wash. 1977)) (discussing
an action to remove children's father as custodian for his children's investment
accounts and as trustee of their real estate trust for breach of his fiduciary
duties, stating "[a] trustee owes the beneficiaries of the trust 'the highest degree
of good faith, care, loyalty and integrity"); Hardy v. Hardy, 263 S.W.2d 690,
694-95 (Ark. 1954).
Using particularly compelling language in a disciplinary hearing against an
attorney who mishandled his clients fund, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
said:
A trustee is a fiduciary of the highest order in whom the hope and
confidence of the settlor are placed with the expectation that the
trustee will exercise the obligations of the office for the exclusive
benefit of the cesnui [sic] que trust. A trustee always owes to the cestui
que trust uberrimafides.

State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wallace, 961 P.2d 818, 826 (Okla. 1998). As the
court notes, uberrima[ides means 'the most abundant good faith, absolute and
perfect candor or openness and honesty."' Id. at 826 n.23 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1690 (4th ed. 1968)).

This obligation has deep historical roots:
When a trustee, in the discharge of his legal duty, has received into his
hands good funds, and seeks to discharge himself from liability
therefor, on the ground that the same has been converted by him into
Confederate money and lost, the burden of proof is upon the party who
insists upon such loss, and he should be required to make clear and
satisfactory proof that he has acted with entire good faith to entitle
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The meaning of good faith in the trust and agency
contexts is essentially the same. In both cases, good faith
obligates the trustee or the agent to act in the best interests
of his beneficiary or principle, even to the extent of favoring
the same over himself.7 8 For example, in challenging the
Illinois Supreme Court to officially define a trustee's good
faith, the lower court stated:
To even wet [sic] your appetite and entice the Appellate Court to
go in and explore this thing, I would offer a definition .... [G]ood
faith means unswerving loyalty and fidelity to the wishes of the
settlor. A loyalty and fidelity which may mean the trustee [sic]

may give the trustee leave to ignore outside influences and
changes and circumstances. That's what I believe good faith
79
means when it's encompassed with trust documents such as this.

When dealing with an Alaska state statute regarding
litigation expenses incurred by an estate representative,
the Supreme Court of Alaska said: "We hold that 'good
faith' under AS 13.16.435 incorporates the statutory
requirement that a personal representative act with the
intent to benefit successors named in the instrument the

him to be protected.
Westbrook v. Davis, 48 Ga. 471, 474 (1873).
78. As one court noted:
The fiduciary owes a duty of the most perfect and scrupulous good faith
("uberrima fides") to his principal.... Not many rules of law are as
entrenched or honored in our system of justice in the United States as are
the fiduciary's duty of full disclosure and the fiduciary's duty of good faith
and loyalty. . . . The duty of good faith and loyalty specifies that a
fiduciary must act in accordance with the highest standard of integrity,
with utmost good faith, and with scrupulous openness, fairness, and
honesty, and a court of equity can and will require such behavior. All the
power, influence, and skill of a fiduciary is to be used for the advantage of
the principal, and not for the personal gain of the fiduciary.
Myer v. Preferred Credit, Inc., 117 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 15-16 (Ct. Com. P1. 2001)
(affirming an award of punitive damages for mortgage broker's improper,
fraudulent, and dishonest dealings under the Mortgage Broker's Act).
79. Goddard v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 532 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (emphasis added, internal citations and quotations omitted)
(quoting the trial court and reversing and remanding for reasons not related to
the definition of "good faith"). Note that the Illinois Supreme Court never
chimed in as requested.
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b. Insurers. "Good faith" exists in insurance law as a
fundamental matter because every insurance contract
contains an implicit obligation that the parties thereto act
in good faith and fair dealing.8 1 This good faith obligation
applies to both parties to the contract,8 2 and it prohibits
either party from acting to impair the right of the other to
receive benefits under the insurance contract.8 3 Traditional
contract remedies are available to either party injured by
the other's failure to act in good faith,8 4 but many
jurisdictions also recognize an independent tort action for
the same.8 5 In addition, some jurisdictions have enacted a
statute that imposes the good faith obligation and defines
penalties for the failure to comply with such.86 The statutes
may expand, restrict, or mirror the common law duty,8 7 or

80. Enders v. Parker, 66 P.3d 11, 17 (Alaska 2003); see ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.435
(2006) (stating that a personal representative who defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith is entitled to receive necessary expenses and
disbursements from the estate).
81. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 198:6 (3d

ed. 2005) [hereinafter COUCH]; see also Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980
(Cal. 1978) (stating that the insurer's duty of good faith to the insured imposes
a number of obligations, including, but not limited to, the duty of an insurer to
accept reasonable settlements of third party claims against its insured and the
duty not to withhold payments due under a policy without good reason). An
insurer's duty to investigate claims filed by an insured may arise from an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Gilderman v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 649 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (including duty to investigate as part of
an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the insured); Warren v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 724 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); see also COUCH,
supra, § 198.27 n.37 (citing both of the above cases).
82. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
83. See Cook v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D.
Mont. 1990); Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993);
see also COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:16 (citing the above cases); 13 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 38:15
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2004) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS].
84. See COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:8.
85. See, e.g., Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing an actionable tort against insurers for breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing).
86. See COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:11.
87. See id.
considerably.").

("[T]he

precise

nature

of the

duty

imposed

may vary
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and
the statutes may create a right of action for insureds 88
89
third parties against insurers for a breach of the duty.
Good faith also often takes on an additional common
law dimension with respect to an insurer because the
insurer is sometimes viewed as a fiduciary. An insurer who
is defending or negotiating a settlement for an insured with
respect to a claim made against the insured is obligated to
act in good faith.9 0 Though the insurer's obligations to the
insured are based, in the first instance, on the insurance
contract between the two parties, as discussed above, the
definition of good faith used by the courts when the insurer
is called upon to fulfill his end of the contractual bargain by
acting on behalf of the insured is more stringent than the
standard good faith and fair dealing definition gleaned from
contract law. To wit, good faith in this insurance context
obligates the insurer to affirmatively act to protect the
interests of the insured. 91 Good faith in this context "means
more than an absence of intent to harm. ' 92 This heightened
standard of conduct has been justified by the courts on the
basis of a myriad of different factors, including the fiduciary
relationship (or degree thereof) between the parties (and all
of the factors that address whether a fiduciary relationship
93
exists), and the insured's ceding of control to the insurer.
88. See Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 184, 187-88 (La. 1997);
Smith v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 699 So. 2d 1192, 1196-97 (La. Ct. App. 1997);
see also COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:11 (citing the above cases).
89. See Theriot, 694 So. 2d at 187-88.
90. See Smoral v. Hanover Ins. Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (App. Div. 1971)
("Good faith in this connection [auto insurance settlement] means more than an
absence of intent to harm. It means an adequate protection of the interests of
the assured." (citation omitted)); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 588 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Smoral, 322 N.Y.S.2d at
14).
91. See Shell Oil Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
92. Id.
93. See Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp.
789, 791 (S.D. Cal. 1990); 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
DISPUTES §§ 10.01 n.7, 10.02(a) (2d ed. Supp. 2005); see also Force v. ITT
Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Minn. 1998); Zilisch v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276, 279-80 (Ariz. 2000); Jonathan
Neil & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones, 94 P.3d 1055, 1068 (Cal. 2004); Communale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 198-202 (Cal. 1958) (stating that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises out of the contractual relationship
but it also creates a duty of care toward the policyholder); Powers v. United
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That said, insurers are not always automatically tied in
a fiduciary relationship to their policyholders.9 4 Indeed, as
noted above, the relationship between the insured and the
insurer is primarily one of contract, founded on the terms of
the insurance agreement.9 5 Courts that go further and find
that there is also a fiduciary relationship between the
insured and the insurer, such that the insurer can be held
to heightened standards of conduct, look to the terms of the
insurance contract to see if the terms create a fiduciary
tie. 96 Two factors impact whether a fiduciary relationship
Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 962 P.2d 596, 602 (Nev. 1998).
Given the fiduciary nature of the insurer-insured relationship, it should
come as no surprise that the "not in good faith" versus "bad faith" debate
discussed later in this Article, rears its ugly head in the insurance context as
well. See infra Part IV. Regarding the suggestion made that an insurer's lack of
good faith should be proven by a complaining insured by establishing bad faith,
Professor Couch says:
Dissenters abound, however, frequently on the ground that it is both
intellectually and practically indefensible to define one term by its
opposite, or its absence. Nor is the attempt to define good faith by
reference to bad faith likely to be entirely satisfactory, given that bad
faith itself has been described as "an imprecise label for what is
essentially some kind of unreasonable insurer conduct, and such words
serve only to obscure and oversimplify the rationale of the decisions."
COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:6 (quoting Austero v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr.
653, 670 n.22 (Ct. App. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Egan v. Mut. of
Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (1979)).
94. See COUCH, supra note 81, §§ 198:7, 198:14; see also EMERIC FISCHER,
PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 93
(3d ed. 2004); STEMPEL, supra note 93, § 10.01 n.7 (providing extensive
commentary and citations regarding fiduciary status). "Note that while the
characteristics which mark a 'good-faith relationship' contract are not exactly,
or not always exactly, the same as those which characterize a fiduciary
relationship, they are similar." COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:14. But
[s]ince the contract specifies the terms upon which the subservient
party's consideration becomes due, it can be strongly argued that once
these terms are met in fact, the subservient party becomes the owner of
the benefits called for by the contract, although the dominant party
retains temporary possession of those funds-a true fiduciary
relationship.
Id.; see also id. § 198:7.
95. See COUCH, supranote 81, § 198:7; see also supranotes 90-94.
96. See COUCH, supra note 81, § 198:7; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Nat'l Catastrophe Adjusters, 185 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing
Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ultimate Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 737 F. Supp. 366, 370
(W.D. Va. 1990)); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703, 708-10 (N.M. Ct. App.
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will be found to exist: (1) whether the contract is a first or
third party insurance contract; and (2) whether the insurer
has a contractual duty to settle and to defend. 97 Third party
insurance benefits accrue to a third party who makes the
claim, as opposed to the policyholder himself, and the
policyholder in a third party insurance contract (that is to
say, the actual party to the contract-the insured) generally
contracts away to the insurer its right to settle and defend
any third party claims. 98 It is this three party set of
interactions and the transfer of control from an insured to
an insurer that leads some courts to find a fiduciary
relationship. If the insurer is acting on behalf of the insured
(policyholder) pursuant to the insurance contract, even
though it is the insured who is being sued by the injured
third party, some courts conclude this transfer of rights
transforms the insurer into the policyholder's agent when it
settles and defends claims, and consequently, the insurer is
a fiduciary or owes duties tantamount to those of a
fiduciary to the policyholder. 99 Other courts reach the same
conclusion without the explicit intermediary step of
agency. 100
1976).
97. See CoucH, supra note 81, § 198:3 (explaining first versus third-party
claims and the duty to settle); STEMPEL, supra note 93, §§ 2.06(f), 9.03(a).
98. See, e.g., Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1983).
99. See Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1959);
Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 179 F.2d 7, 9 (10th Cir. 1949);
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 505 (N.J.
1974).
100. See Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d
Cir. 2000) (applying Pennsylvania law); Force v. ITT Hartford Life & Annuity
Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843, 853-54 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding relationship is true
fiduciary); Hassard, Bonington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp.
789, 792 (S.D. Cal. 1990); Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d
276, 279-80 (Ariz. 2000) (holding relationship is a true fiduciary one); Berges v.
Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665, 677 (Fla. 2004); O'Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769
N.E.2d 100, 109-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("[W]hen a liability insurance company
employs policy terms that obtain the irrevocable power to determine whether an
offer to compromise a personal-injury claim will be accepted or rejected, it
creates a fiduciary relationship between it and the insured with resulting duties
that grow out of that relationship."); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515,
518-19 (Ind. 1993); Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 962 P.2d 596, 602 (Nev.
1998); Brown v. Progressive Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004);
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 140 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Myers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 689, 690-91 (Vt. 1986); Tank v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Wash. 1986); Anderson v.

2007]

GOOD FAITH

491

3. Good Faith in Contracts and Commercial Law.
Because good faith is so regularly and consistently defined
in the commercial and contracts law realms, good faith in
these contexts merits a closer look in this Article. In
addition, directors are contractually obligated to the
corporations that they serve, such that, at the least, good
faith in the commercial and contracts law realms should be
a floor on a director's good faith obligation.
Good faith arises in two main ways in the contracts and
commercial law realms: one way is more focused on mental
state-"a good faith purchaser"-and one way is focused on
objective performance. A good faith purchaser is one who
purchases something with no knowledge of any underlying
fraud or illegality impeding the free transfer of title. 10 1 A
party is a good faith purchaser "only if he acted with
innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion" regarding notice
that his purchase from a seller whose own title to the object
at issue was voidable or was somehow legally
questionable. 102 A purchaser in good faith should not be
punished but should be protected. 103 With respect to good
Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375-76 (Wis. 1978); Alt v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 237 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Wis. 1976).
Interestingly, a few courts, including some of those in Delaware, seem to
have taken, or at least toyed with, the position that no heightened duties are
owed to a policyholder in any instance because the policyholder-insurer
relationship is purely contractual. See Corrado Bros. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
562 A.2d 1188, 1192 (Del. 1989) (holding insurer owes no special duties to
policyholder even when resulting settlement required policyholder to pay
retroactive premiums, but noting that the insurer has the burden of
demonstrating that it acted reasonably and in good faith when its interests
diverged from those of the policyholder); Johnson v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Duncan v. Andrew County Mut. Ins.
Co., 665 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). But see Tackett v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 265 n.6 (Del. 1995) ("The Tacketts argue that,
like Cummings, their claim arose in a relationship of 'trust and confidence.'
While there may be a fiduciary obligation in an insurer's handling of a thirdparty claim, '[t]he mere relationship of insurer and insured does not import an
obligation of trust."' (quoting Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mut. Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d
716, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (emphasis added)).
101. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666,
668 (1963).
102. Id.
103. See id. Professor Farnsworth gives us two illustrations:
Whether the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course
depends, under the Code, on whether he purchased in good faith.
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faith performance, a party to a contract or a merchant is
obligated to perform their contractual or commercial
good faith assessment is
obligations "in good faith."'104 This
10 5
arguably an objective analysis.
Whether the purchaser of goods takes good title from a seller whose
own title is voidable because of fraud depends, under the Code, on
whether he purchased in good faith.
Id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 3-205, 3-302 (1958)).
104. Id. at 668-69.
If the parties to a sales contract leave price or performance terms open,
to be fixed by either buyer or seller, that party is to fix them, under the
Code, in good faith. If they describe the quantity as seller's output or
buyer's requirements, their obligations are defined under the Code in
terms of such output or requirements as may occur in good faith. If a
merchant buyer is left in possession of goods that he has rightfully
rejected, his obligation to effect salvage under the Code is one of good
faith. Or if the seller, before performance, has assigned his right to
payment under his contract with the buyer, their power to modify their
agreement, even after notice, is limited by the requirement that the
modifications must be made in good faith. In each of these instances
"good faith" would appear to be used in the sense of good faith
performance. And each represents a specific application of the general
obligation of good faith-resulting in an implied term of the contract
requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that
another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations.
Id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-603(3), 9-318(2) (1958)).
105. The late Professor Allan Farnsworth, principal draftsman of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Restatement of Contracts, argued
that good faith in the performance aspects of contracts jurisprudence hinged on
an objective standard. He maintained that fixing good faith performance on a
subjective standard would make no sense, as "[s]urely the test is not whether
one party actually believed that he was acting decently, fairly or reasonably.
Surely he must do more than form an honest judgment. Otherwise no more
than knowing and deliberate unfairness, maliciousness, trickery and deceit
would be forbidden." Id. at 672.
At one point, I was convinced that Vice Chancellor Strine indirectly
addressed the point with the following language from Guttman v. Huang, 823
A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003):
A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in
the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best
interest. For this reason, the same case that invented the so-called
"triad[ ]" of fiduciary duty, also defined good faith as loyalty.
It does no service to our law's clarity to continue to separate the
duty of loyalty from its own essence; nor does the recognition that good
faith is essential to loyalty demean or subordinate that essential
requirement. There might be situations when a director acts in
subjective good faith and is yet not loyal (e.g., if the director is
interested in a transaction subject to the entire fairness standard and
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The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")10 6 provides
that "[e]very contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement,"' 10 7 and the U.C.C. defines good faith as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."108
The latter articulation of good faith-good faith
performance-is the more sticky of the good faith
cannot prove financial fairness), but there is no case in which a director
can act in subjective bad faith towards the corporation and act loyally.
The reason for the disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the
underlying motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilistic) for
conscious action not in the corporation's best interest does not make it
faithful, as opposed to faithless.
(citations omitted).
Upon reflection, Vice Chancellor Strine's last sentence perplexes me. With
that sentence, he seems to be saying that faithfulness is judged objectively, with
no reference to underlying motive. I would take that to mean that good faith
(e.g., "faithfulness") is judged objectively. Yet Strine uses the phrase "faithful"
to pertain to the duty of loyalty assessment. So he seems to be saying that good
faith can be a subjective assessment, while loyalty will be an objective
assessment, despite the fact that he uses "faithfulness," which I almost view as
a synonym for "good faith," to refer only to loyalty.
106. The U.C.C. was proposed to create a uniform body of contract law and
has been adopted by forty-nine states. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 71-73 (West 2001) (1946). The preamble to the
U.C.C. states that it applies to "[c]ertain Commercial Transactions in or
regarding Property and Contracts and other Documents concerning them." E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.9(a) (2d ed. 1998). It is
unclear whether provisions of Article I of the U.C.C. apply only to transactions
within the scope of those in later articles or whether it applies to all
"commercial" contracts. See id. However, provisions that are generally accepted,
such as U.C.C. § 1-203 on good faith, are usually applied broadly in the
commercial transactions and contracts realm. See id. Additionally, even where a
provision is not directly applicable to a transaction, the principle within the
provision may still serve as a source of law. See FULLER & EISENBERG, supra, at
72. Therefore, even where the contract at issue does not directly fall into a
category covered by the U.C.C., the principles of the U.C.C. are often still
viewed as persuasive authority and are followed.
107. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004).
108. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2004). Farnsworth criticizes such a characterization
of good faith, noting that the U.C.C. definition leaves the duty of good faith "so
enfeebled that it could scarcely qualify ... as an 'overriding' or 'super-eminent'
principle." Farnsworth, supra note 101, at 674. Apparently the good faith
definition was enfeebled by the practicing bar's objections to the language in
prior drafts, which practicing attorneys saw as affording to courts
"opportunities . . . to create innovative commercial obligations." Clayton P.
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligationof Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 624
(1981).
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invocations in the U.C.C. and otherwise in the commercial
and contracts areas of the law.
Honesty in fact and fair dealing, as used to define good
faith performance, superficially seem to be uncomplicated
phrases, but the actual implication of these phrases and the
essence of the meaning of good faith performance was the
subject of quite some debate immediately before and after
the U.C.C. was adopted. Professor Robert S. Summers's
"excluder" method of defining good faith emerged from the
debate as a favored method for more precisely defining good
faith performance in the contract and commercial law
realm. The "excluder" method of defining good faith came
from a 1968 article penned by Professor Summers in which
he argued that good faith should be treated as an
"excluder," with no single useful definition of its own. 109
Instead of struggling to define good faith in and of itself,

109. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196, 23243 (1968). Professor Steven Burton helpfully describes Professor Summers's
excluder analysis as follows: "the function of 'good faith' is not to contribute
positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude possible ways of
being in bad faith, which are both numerous and varied." Steven J. Burton,
More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract:A Reply to Professor Summers,
69 IowA L. REV. 497, 498 (1984).
It is worth adding a bit more detail to my description of Professor
Summers's excluder analysis. Professor Summers argues in his much extolled
article that good faith in the context of general contract law and the U.C.C.
should be treated as an excluder, defined in a context-specific way by reference
to bad faith and things that do not exhibit good faith. Summers, supra, at 200.
To wit, Professor Summers maintains that good faith should be defined by
things that were intended to be excluded from occurring by being deemed acts of
bad faith. Id. If we can identify acts that constitute bad faith, we can define
good faith by pointing to the absence of any of the bad faith acts. Professor
Summers argued both that the gossamer nature of the phrase lends itself to
this sort of post hoc defining and that it is practical to define the phrase this
way "because the typical judge who uses this phrase is primarily concerned with
ruling out specific conduct." Id. at 202. Colorfully, Professor Summers
summarized his justification for his dogma by saying "general definitions of
good faith either spiral into the Charybdis of vacuous generality or collide with
the Scylla of restrictive specificity." Id. at 206. For those less familiar with
erudite words, Merriam-Webster Online dictionary defines Charybdis as
"whirlpool off the coast of Sicily personified in Greek mythology as a female
monster," Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/charybdis
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006); and Scylla is defined as "a nymph changed into a
monster in Greek mythology who terrorizes mariners in the Strait of Messina."
Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/scylla (last visited
Mar. 12, 2006).
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Summers argued that good faith is best viewed as a term
referring to the absence of bad faith-good faith includes
acts that exclude bad faith. 110 If no form of "bad faith" is
present, the actor acted in "good faith."
Good faith definitions in the commercial and contracts
realms are not limited to the excluder analysis. Twelve
years later, Steven Burton introduced the "foregone
opportunity analysis" to the good faith discussion in
contract law, and this analysis describes good faith as
"limit[ing] the exercise of discretion in performance
conferred on one party by the contract."11 ' According to
Professor Burton, "[g]ood faith performance.. . occurs when
a party's discretion is exercised for any purpose within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of
formation .... ,,112 A decade later still, Professor William
Patterson concurred that good faith was contextual,
accounting
for the reasonable expectation of the contracting
13
parties.1

110. See Summers, supra note 109. Indeed, Professor Farnsworth concludes
that the Second Restatement of Contracts adopts this excluder analysis, by
providing that:
A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the
following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial
decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a
power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance.
supra note 106, § 7.17b (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981)). However, for a discussion of the problems of
defining one term by its opposite, see infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
111. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 369, 373 (1980); see also
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989) ("[U]nder an
agreement that . . . invest[s] one party with a degree of discretion in
performance sufficient to deprive another party of a substantial proportion of
the agreement's value, the parties' intent to be bound by an enforceable contract
raises an implied obligation of good faith to observe reasonable limits in
exercising that discretion .... "); FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b n.19
(citing both Professor Burton and Centronics Corp.).
112. Burton, supra note 111, at 373.
FARNSWORTH,

113. See DENNIS M. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY: TOWARD

A UNIFIED THEORY 58-59 (1990). Notwithstanding the fact that Professor
Summers's excluder analysis picked up considerable momentum after the
publication of his article in 1968, not everyone then agreed with or now agrees
with his analysis. See id. at 59.
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Beyond the U.C.C. pure contracts realm, the definition
and role of good faith in the common law and more general
contracts context applies in a way that basically parallels
what we see in the commercial law context. 114 "[I]n every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing," 115 although the definition and parameters of
good faith vary according to the context. 116 The good faith
obligation in contract law, 1 7 which is performance-directed,
is based on fundamental notions of fairness, 118 and it "is not

114. The U.C.C. draft dealing with good faith in the context of commercial
transaction was drafted by Karl N. Llewellyn and adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1952 and later adopted by the individual
states. See FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 106, at 72. The Second
Restatement of Contracts was primarily drafted by Farnsworth and Robert
Braucher and was adopted in 1981. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 1.8.
115. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y.
1933) (citation omitted); see also Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583
N.E.2d 806, 821 (Mass. 1991) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied
even "incontracts between sophisticated businesspeople"); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 106, § 7.17 n.3 (citing the above cases). Similarly, good faith is implicated
in the performance and enforcement of every contract. See Kirke La Shelle Co.,
188 N.E. at 167; see also U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004) ("Every contract or duty within
[the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205

(1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 106,
§ 7.17; 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS:

FORMATION

OF

CONTRACTS

§ 5.27 (1995)

[hereinafter

CORBIN]

("[E]very contract contains an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and enforcement.").
116. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17. For example, "the duty may
not only proscribe undesirable conduct, but may require affirmative action as
well." Id.
117. Unfortunately, many academics employ the terms duty, obligation, and
covenant interchangeably when discussing good faith. See id. This Article
employs the term obligation.
118. See id. Note that good faith is distinguishable from the concept of "best
efforts" in the contract context:
Good faith is a standard that has honesty and fairness at its core and
that is imposed on every party to a contract. Best efforts is a standard
that has diligence as its essence and is imposed on those contracting
parties that have undertaken such performance. The two standards are
distinct and that of best efforts is the more exacting, though it
presumably falls short of the standard required of a fiduciary, who is
required "to act primarily for the benefit of another in matter
connected with his undertaking."
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a contractual term that the parties are free to bargain in or
out as they see fit."119 However, there is no one
authoritative definition of the phrase. 120 Good faith in the
contracts realm can be addressed by reference to the Second
Restatement of Contracts, common law, and the opining of
some of the bastions of modern contract law.
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides that
"[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement."' 121 Comment a to Section 205 of the
Restatement provides that "[g]ood faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of
types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith'
because they violate community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness." 122 Note that Comment a
reflects both an affirmative aspect and an "excluder"
component, while Comment d ("Good faith performance")
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 313 cmt. a (1958)).
119. Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp. of Vt., 635 A.2d 1211,
1216 (Vt. 1993); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17 n.6 (citing the
same). The U.C.C. also recognizes that the duty of good faith may not be
completely waived:
The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care
prescribed by [the Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed
by agreement. The parties, by agreement, may determine the
standards by which the performance of those obligations is to be
measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Whenever [the Uniform Commercial Code] requires an action to be
taken within a reasonable time, a time that is not manifestly
unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2004).
120. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b ("Many courts have endorsed
abstract and sweeping definitions of good faith.").
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). As noted, E. Allan
Farnsworth and Robert Braucher were primarily responsible for the drafting of
the Second Restatement of Contracts. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, §1.8.
The American Law Institute began revising the Restatement of Contracts in
1962, with Braucher serving as its Reporter until his appointment to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1971. See id.; Robert Braucher,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1981, at D19. Farnsworth then replaced Braucher as the
Reporter and worked on the draft until it was published in 1981. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, §1.8.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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within the same section of the Restatement reflects only an
excluder analysis when discussing the performance of a
contract:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be
justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or
may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than
honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible,
but the following types are among those which have been
recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's
performance. 123

Beyond the Restatement, common law varies a bit in
terms of the exact language used to define good faith in the
contractual context. 124 For example, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming described good faith in the contractual context as
requiring 'an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another .... -,125 The Eighth
Circuit Federal Court of Appeals concluded that good faith
obligates each party to a contract "to do nothing destructive
of the other party's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract
and to do everything that the contract presupposes they
will do to accomplish its purpose." 126 A state court in
Kansas used a reaching application of "good faith" to find
that even if a termination was technically made in
compliance with the negotiated-for termination provisions
of a contract, the terminating party had the obligation to
act in good faith when employing the termination provision,
to avoid taking advantage of changed circumstances that
adversely affected the non-terminating party. 127

123. Id. § 205 cmt. d; FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b (quoting part of
the same).
124. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b ("Many courts have endorsed
abstract and sweeping definitions of good faith.").
125. Wendling v. Cundall, 568 P.2d 888, 890 (Wyo. 1977) (quoting Gress v.
Evans, 46 N.W. 1132, 1134 (Dakota 1877)); FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b
(citing the same).
126. Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir. 1985)
(citation omitted); FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17b (citing the same).
127. See Baker v. Ratzlaff, 564 P.2d 153, 156-57 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977). With

respect to the exercise of discretion in performance of a contract, good faith
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Similar to common law, the late Professor Samuel
Williston defined good faith in the contracts realm as a
requirement that "neither party will do anything which will
have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract .... ,,128 The
late Professor E. Allan Farnsworth viewed good faith as
essentially a gap-filler, used to imply missing terms in a
contract, and "[g]ood faith performance has always required
the cooperation of one party where it was necessary in order
that the other might secure the expected benefits of the
129
contract."
4. Corporate Governance. Although "good faith" in
corporate law generally and as appearing in the director
liability jurisprudence is not yet often accompanied with a
consistent, affirmative "good faith" definition 13 0 -hence this
"requires the party vested with discretion under a contract to 'exercise that
discretion reasonably and with proper

motive . . . not . . . arbitrarily,

capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of
the parties."' Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Vehicle Review Bd., 788 N.E.2d 187, 196
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 972
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984)) (discussing performance under a franchise agreement).
128. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 83, § 38:15; see also CORBIN, supra

note 115, § 5.27.
129. Farnsworth, supra note 101, at 672.
130. See E. Norman Veasey, State-FederalTension in CorporateGovernance
and the ProfessionalResponsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 448 (2003)
(noting that "the jurisprudence of good faith is unresolved").
To be clear, understand that the phrase "good faith" has long been appearing
in the context of director liability. See infra note 193. Most frequently, however,
the phrase is left undefined or it is accompanied by an additional phrase such
as "in ...

the best interests of the corporation [and/or shareholder] .

. . ."

Baker

v. Health Mgmt. Sys., 264 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A corporation may
indemnify any person . . . if such director or officer acted, in good faith, for a
purpose which he reasonably believed to be in . . . the best interests of the
corporation .... " (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 2000)); FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A
director shall perform the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner
such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders .... " (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1998)); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[The business judgment rule] is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."). It is curious to me that the
latter phrase often accompanies "good faith," because, as I discuss in Part III,
infra, I am of the view that good faith means "in the best interests of the
shareholder." The question then becomes whether the writers who include
language directing that a director is obligated to act "in good faith and in the
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Article-the occasional court or corporate law scholar will
pen something remotely akin to a definition of good faith.
For example, in the context of a statutory embodiment of
the business judgment rule, it was found that "good faith"
presents a question as to whether "a process was engaged
that would produce a defensible business decision," and the
"procedural soundness of a business decision may be
assessed by examining the qualifications of the persons
with whom the director consulted, the general topics, not
the substance, of the information sought or imparted and,
in this court's view even whether the advice was
followed."131
In a derivative suit against directors for failing to
prevent a damaging corporate financial restatement due to
accounting irregularities, Delaware Court of Chancery Vice
Chancellor Leo Strine equated good faith with loyalty,
noting: "A director cannot act loyally towards the
corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her
actions are in the corporation's best interest. For this
reason, the same case that invented the so-called 'triad[ ]' of
fiduciary duty ...also defined good faith as loyalty.'' 132
best interests of the corporation" realize that they are being redundant, are
intending to emphasize the meaning of good faith by repeating it, or do not
believe that they are being redundant.
131. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 142, 146 (W.D. Va.
1994) (discussing an action to determine the constitutionality of corporate acts
under the Virginia Control Share Acquisition Act and to validate a rights plan
adopted by the board of directors).
132. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citing Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (Cede I)) (emphasis
added). Note that the Cede II opinion did not explicitly define "good faith" as
loyalty on the page cited by Vice Chancellor Strine. Rather, on page 361 of the
Cede II opinion, the Cede court says: "To rebut the [business judgment rule], a
shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that
directors . . . breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good
faith, loyalty or due care." Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. However, note 36 on
page 368 of the Cede II opinion states that "a board's actions must be evaluated
in light of relevant circumstances to determine if they were undertaken with
due diligence [care] and good faith [loyalty]." Id. at 368 n.36 (quoting Barkan v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)).
Vice Chancellor Strine is not alone with the argument that "good faith"
really only refers to the director's avoidance of conflicts (divided loyalty). Agency
and trust cases often discuss good faith in a manner that suggests it is
synonymous with loyalty. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wallace, 1998 OK 65,
961 P.2d 818, 826 (discussing a disciplinary hearing against an attorney who
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The recent Disney derivative litigation has repeatedly
brought good faith into the domain of the Delaware state
courts, though only one of the several opinions in the casean opinion from the Delaware Court of Chancery
announcing its judgment after the bench trial-says
anything of use in terms of affirmatively defining good
faith. 133 Though the Delaware Supreme Court issued a final
opinion in the case affirming the trial court's decision in
favor of the Disney directors and made repeated reference
to a director's obligation to act in good faith, the Delaware
Supreme Court said nothing about the definition of good
faith itself. Instead, the court approved the Chancery
Court's definition of "not in good faith" by way of bad
faith. 134
mishandled his client's trust funds and stating that good faith recognizes that
"the hope and confidence of the settlor are placed with the expectation that the
trustee will exercise the obligations of the office for the exclusive benefit of the
cesnui [sic] que trust"). Yet, in those cases, and many others, the phrases "good
faith and loyalty" and "utmost good faith and loyalty" appear together, with the
phrase "good faith" accompanying the word "loyalty." Myer v. Preferred Credit,
Inc., 117 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 15-16 (Ct. Com. P1. 2001) (affirming an award of
punitive damages for mortgage broker's improper, fraudulent, and dishonest
dealings under the Mortgage Brokers Act). If good faith and loyalty really did
mean the same thing, such that good faith was merely a synonym for loyalty,
the phrase "good faith and loyalty" would be redundant. Note that the Delaware
Supreme Court recently chimed in on this issue, saying "the fiduciary duty of
loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary
conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in
good faith." Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006).
133. The Disney cases include: In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del.
Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003);
and Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
134. I would like to blame the Delaware Supreme Court for this substantive
failing, but the reality is that neither the appellants nor the appellees raised
the issue of defining good faith at oral argument before the court. One would
have thought that the Delaware Supreme Court would have brought up the
issue sua sponte, as they are permitted. One would be wrong. It is for reasons
like this that I chuckle when reading Delaware Supreme Court's statement that
"Delaware has a substantial interest in defining, regulating and enforcing the
fiduciary obligations which directors of Delaware corporations owe to such
corporations and the shareholders who elected them." Armstrong v. Pomerance,
423 A.2d 174, 179 n.8 (Del. 1980) (quoting 61 Del. Laws c. 119 (1977)).
Delaware does have a substantial interest in defining, regulating, and enforcing
the fiduciary obligations of directors, but this interest obviously does not always
result in the Delaware Supreme Court's robust definition, regulation, and
enforcement of those obligations. It should be no surprise that I am sympathetic
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The one statement from the lengthy Disney litigation
that deals affirmatively with good faith is from the opinion
and order of the Chancery Court: "Good faith has been said
to require an 'honesty of purpose,' and a genuine care for
the fiduciary's constituents, but, at least in the corporate
fiduciary context, it is probably easier to define bad faith
rather than good faith."'135 Thanks for the help.

to the "race-to-the-bottom" discussion regarding Delaware's director-coddling
statutes and permissive fiduciary common law.
135. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch.
2005) (citations omitted). The Chancellor later added, "To act in good faith, a
director must act at all times with an honesty of purpose and in the best
interests and welfare of the corporation." Id. at 755. The Chancellor goes on to
justify his decision to define good faith by way of bad faith in the way that the
Chancellor recognizes most courts have done by saying "[t]his may be so
because Delaware law presumes that directors act in good faith when making
business judgments." Id. 753. I address this issue in Part I.B, supra. The upshot
is that defining good faith affirmatively does not result in directors being
stripped of the good faith business judgment rule presumption from Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
Note that Chancellor Chandler continues in his good faith opining to say:
Bad faith has been defined as authorizing a transaction "for some
purpose other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate welfare or
[when the transaction] is known to constitute a violation of applicable
positive law." In other words, an action taken with the intent to harm
the corporation is a disloyal act in bad faith. A similar definition was
used seven years earlier, when Chancellor Allen wrote that bad faith
(or lack of good faith) is when a director acts in a manner "unrelated to
a pursuit of the corporation's best interests." It makes no difference the
reason why the director intentionally fails to pursue the best interests
of the corporation.
Id. at 753-54 (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2
(Del. Ch. 1996); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL
7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989)).
Yet, in a footnote five pages later, Chancellor Chandler appears to embrace
a much broader interpretation of what good faith requires, going well beyond
traditional "bad faith," by referencing Professor Lyman Johnson's article, in
which he advocates broadly interpreting a director's duty of loyalty to compel
directors to be loyal to-faithful to-shareholders in the broader sense, much
the way one would act loyally to a friend. Id. at 760 n.487 (citing Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003)). In this schizophrenic footnote, referring to situations
where the directors are alleged to be under the thumb of the CEO, the
Chancellor says:
It is precisely in this context-an imperial CEO or controlling
shareholder with a supine or passive board-that the concept of good
faith may prove highly meaningful. The fiduciary duties of care and
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In the twenty years since the 1986 Smith v. Van
Gorkom decision, which is roundly viewed as the definitive
modern case marking a shift in director liability common
law, the Delaware Supreme Court has only once addressed
good faith in a way that even roughly equated with an
affirmative definition:
Thus, while numerous factors-timing, publicity, tax advantages,
and Amsted's declining performance-point to the directors' good
faith belief that the shareholders were getting the best price, we
decline to fashion an iron-clad rule for determining when a market
test is not required. The evidence that will support a finding of
good faith in the absence of some sort of market test is by nature
circumstantial; therefore, its evaluation by a court must be opentextured. However, the crucial element for supporting a finding of
good faith is knowledge. It must be clear that the board had
sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to form the basis136
for its
belief that it acted in the best interests of the shareholders.

Every other time in the past twenty years that the
Delaware Supreme Court has dealt with a director's
obligation to act in good faith, the court has done so 137
by way
of defining and looking for the existence of bad faith.
loyalty, as traditionally defined, may not be aggressive enough to
protect shareholder interests when the board is well advised, is not
legally beholden to the management or a controlling shareholder and
when the board does not suffer from other disabling conflicts of
interest, such as a patently self-dealing transaction. Good faith may
serve to fill this gap and ensure that the persons entrusted by
shareholders to govern Delaware corporations do so with an honesty of
purpose and with an understanding of whose interests they are there
to protect.
Id. at 760 n.487 (internal citations omitted).
136. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1288.
137. See, e.g., White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553-54 n.36 (Del. 2001)
(discussing a derivative action, alleging that the board failed to take action to
stop or sanction sexual misconduct of a corporate officer and stating that "[t]o
prevail on a waste claim or a bad faith claim, the plaintiff must overcome the
general presumption of good faith by showing that the board's decision was so
egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment
of the corporation's best interests"); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (discussing an action where a shareholder of
a purchased corporation sued former board of directors alleging breach of
fiduciary duty and gross negligence and stating that "[t]he [business judgment
rule] presumption initially attaches to a director-approved transaction within a
board's conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence of 'fraud,
bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment"')
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Corporate law academics who have yet chimed in on the
good faith dialogue with respect to director liability differ in
their articulations and approaches to good faith. Professor
David Rosenberg states that "good faith is a circle around
which all duties, corporate or contractual, are surrounded.
A director who agrees to adhere to the terms of a corporate
charter must do so in good faith . .
*.."138
Professor
Rosenberg takes a very robust view of the reach of good
faith in his contractarian article, and he bases his position
on the foundation of good faith in both the corporate law
and contracts law realms. Professor Hillary Sale concludes
that good faith in the corporate context is similar to scienter
in securities fraud jurisprudence, such that we should
analyze good faith in an analogous way. 139 While not
defining good faith directly, Professor Sale appears to
attempt to describe what good faith is not, saying
"[a]lthough a breach of good faith need not be intentional or
conscious, it does require some sort of obvious, deliberate,

(quoting Grobow v. Perrot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)).
Though not speaking for the Delaware Supreme Court, former Chief Justice
of the court, Norman Veasey, stated in a speech that:
[G]ood faith requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a
disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for the corporate
good, but not caring for the well-being of the constituents of the
fiduciary

.

.

.

. [A]n

argument

could

be

made

that reckless,

disingenuous, irresponsible, or irrational conduct-but not necessarily
self-dealing or larcenous conduct-could implicate concepts of good
faith.
E. Norman Veasey, Speech, CorporateGovernance and Ethics in the Post-Enron
Worldcom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 851 (2003).
Additionally, Delaware Supreme Court Justice Joseph Walsh, while not
specifically speaking of good faith and not speaking for the court, noted that a
director qua fiduciary is obligated to, among other things, act "affirmatively to
protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge." Joseph T.
Walsh, The FiduciaryFoundationof CorporateLaw, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333-34
(2002).
138. Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 513.
139. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 493
(2004) ("Although a breach of good faith need not be intentional or conscious, it
does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure. That
standard is like the standard of review applied to pleadings of scienter in
securities fraud claims: motive is relevant, but not required. Intentional
misstatements or omissions are actionable and intentional breaches of fiduciary
duties should be as well.").
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or egregious failure,"1 40 and "[i]f the conduct at issue 14is1
sufficiently irresponsible . . . good faith is implicated."'

Professor Sale essentially defines good faith with a scienterbased excluder analysis, without
explaining why it is
142
justifiable to take that position.
Professor Sean Griffith also does not directly define
good faith in his corporate good faith article; rather, he
attempts to explain its existence:
Good faith . . .has, at its core, the basic concern of all corporate

law jurisprudence-the question whether directors are really
doing their best in acting for the corporation-but in seeking an
answer, it blends questions generally thought to arise under the
duty of care with those arising under the duty of loyalty. In
seeking to answer the basic corporate law question, courts
applying the good faith standard do not confine themselves to the
analytics of either traditional fiduciary duty. Instead, good faith is
used as a loose rhetorical device that courts can wield to find
liability or enjoin actions
that do not quite fit within established
143
doctrinal categories.

Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg, founding father of
modern corporate governance, also does not advance the
definitional ball regarding good faith. Rather, he describes
qua defines good faith by looking at its value and its
function. While he loosely defines good faith by aligning it
with the U.C.C. and contracts definitions 144
of good faith, he
stakes no definitional ground beyond that.
In short, though the corporate law realm is ripe for the
adoption of an affirmative definition of good faith, such has

140. Id. at 493. With due respect, note that it appears that Professor Sale
cites no source for the very strong language in her statement.
141. Id. at 487. Professor Sale continues to say that good faith conduct does
not include conduct that is "deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or
knowing," though she does not tell us what any of these terms mean. Id. at 488.
In addition, at one point Professor Sale suggests that "egregious, subversive, or
deliberately indifferent conduct" does not evince good faith. Id. at 490. It is
unclear to me, however, how deliberately indifferent conduct differs
substantively from normal indifference or inadvertent indifference. I suppose
that that is a subtlety much like the difference between "intentionally
subverted" conduct, which would violate a director's fiduciary duties according
to Sale, and unintentionally subversive conduct. Id. at 485.
142. See id. at 490.
143. Griffith, supra note 50, at 34.
144. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 52.
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not yet already occurred.
C. The Proprietyof "Borrowing"a Definition of Good Faith
Given the richness and extent of the "good faith"
discourse in other areas of the law, there is a temptation to
"adopt" a definition of good faith from a different area of the
law to import to the director liability context. 145 That
inclination is initially appealing, given the wellspring of
good faith definitions from which to draw some inspiration
in the effort to define the phrase in the world of director
liability. However, the director liability realm is very
different than most other areas of the law, such that it is
inappropriate to borrow wholesale a good faith definition
from another area of the law. My position is that good faith
should have some sort of generally agreed-upon, albeit
broad, definition in the director liability and corporate
governance realm, and that definition should not consist of
a wholesale adoption of the good faith definition from a
different area of the law. Though there is much to be
gleaned from the above-surveyed good faith definitions from
other areas of the law, due to the circumstantial nature of
the meaning of the phrase, good faith's definition should be
tailored to the sphere of corporate governance. Further, I
am of the view that the definition of good faith should be
affirmative, as opposed to excluder-based.
Below I explain why I oppose adopting wholesale a
definition of good faith from another area of the law, and
why I maintain that an affirmative definition, as opposed to
an ex post excluder analysis, is appropriate for addressing
good faith in the corporate governance realm. The upshot of
my argument is that the relationship with respect to which
the phrase "good faith" applies in the corporate context is a
"special relationship," justifying a more demanding
definition of good faith than can be found in other areas of
the law where the actor does not have a special

145. Chancellor Chandler, in the recent Disney litigation, seems to almost
suggest that importing a definition might have been worth considering, when
he says, "[diespite the existence of significant jurisprudence with respect to good
faith in the contractual context of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Delaware decisions have shown a reluctance to importing these contractual
standards into the corporate fiduciary realm." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 n.449 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citation omitted).
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relationship. In addition, the director liability context is a
fiduciary context, such that analogies to the world of armslength transactions do not well fit.
As discussed above, directors of a corporation have
historically been viewed as agents and/or trustees. 146 Even
if we cannot decide whether directors are trustees or agents
or both, directors are unquestionably fiduciaries and, as
such, they have fiduciary duties. 147 Knowing that the
director holds a fiduciary position helps define good faith in
the director liability context in two ways: (1) it transfers us

146. Some would argue that directors are merely parties to a contract with
the shareholders or the corporation itself, such that the directors are neither
trustees nor agents. This contractual relationship argument strikes me as stillborn, given the clear historical foundation supporting the proposition that
corporations can only act through agents, such being directors and officers. See
MERTON FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 295, at 413 (1954) ("[A]n agent is a
fiduciary in relation to his principal .... "); FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW ON PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 187-88 (2d ed. 1924) ("[A] corporation, being

impersonal, can act only through the intervention of agents.").
147. See infra Part III; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("The
directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to
the stockholders but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.");
Walsh, supra note 137, at 334 ("[T]he fiduciary underpinnings of director
responsibility have been clearly established .... ).
'Fiduciary' includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied,
guardian,
administrator,
executor,
resulting or constructive,
conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the
benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or
private, public officer, or any other persons acting in a fiduciary
capacity for any person, trust, or estate.
UNIF. FIDUCIARIES ACT § 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 367 (1922).
As aforementioned, scholars have consistently been inconsistent as to
whether the fiduciary position of directors was one of trust or agency. Professor
Evans spoke to this issue well over a century ago:
All trustees ... ,are agents; but all agents are not trustees. A trustee is
an agent and something more. An agent is simply one placed in the
stead of another; he is a trustee only so far as there is vested in him for
the benefit of another some estate, interest, or power in or affecting
property of any description .

.

.

. Directors are persons selected to

manage the affairs of a company for the benefit not of themselves but
of the shareholders. Their office is one of trust.
WILLIAM EVANS, THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 319, 339 (2d. ed. 1888). That
said, the distinction might well be irrelevant for our purposes given that "[i]t is
well settled that an agent is a fiduciary in relation to his principal just as a
trustee is a fiduciary in relation to his cestui que trust." FERSON, supra note 146,
§ 295, at 413.
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into a duty-based realm where rules are predictably
148
different than in the realm of arm's-length transactions;
the pool of possible
and, therefore, (2) it helps us narrow
"good faith" definitions to consider.149
1. A FiduciaryRelationship. The fiduciary relationship
contemplates a person acting in trust and confidence for the
benefit of another with respect to the relationship
undertaken by him 150 and, as such, "good faith" as used in
the fiduciary context has a degree of narrowness to it. 1 1 A
defining aspect of the fiduciary context is the existence of
the fiduciary-a person who is acting on behalf of or for the
benefit of someone else. 152 A fiduciary has long been
148. As one scholar noted:
[T]he law makes it unnecessary for a principal who delegates power to
manage his property to an agent to provide by contract an array of
prohibitions against the agent diverting to himself the principal's
assets. The law of fiduciary obligations does that. It thereby facilitates
specialization in economic enterprise, which enhances productivity for
society, by saving the cost of individually contracting for the agent's
loyalty in a myriad of situations, not all of which can be anticipated.
Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A
Opportunities, 94 HARv. L. REV. 997, 999 (1981).

New

Look

at Corporate

149. See D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of FiduciaryDuty,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) ("[F]iduciary relationships form when one
party (the 'fiduciary') acts on behalf of another party (the 'beneficiary') while
exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary.").
150. See Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 911 n.2 (Tex. App.
1991) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 563 (5th ed. 1979)). "The term 'fiduciary'
is derived from the civil law. It is impossible to give a definition of the term that
is comprehensive enough to cover all cases. Generally speaking, it applies to
any person who occupies a position of peculiar confidence towards another. It
refers to integrity and fidelity." Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160
S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942).
151. Professors Adler and Mann actually chart out in tables the interplay
between the fiduciary nature of the "good faith" relationship at issue and the
contracting protection offered to the aggrieved party by the court. See Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine, 28
AKRON L. REV. 31, 45, 51-52 (1994).
152. As Ernest Huffcut noted long ago:
The relation existing between a principal and his agent is a fiduciary
one, and consequently the most absolute good faith is essential. The
principal relies upon the fidelity and integrity of the agent, and it is the
duty of the agent, in return, to be loyal to the trust imposed in him,
and to execute it with the single purpose of advancing his principal's

2007]

GOOD FAITH

509

obligated "to do the best he can for his principal."'153 This
relationship is very different from an arms-length
relationship where "the parties owe each other no special
1 54
duties and each is acting in his or her own self-interest."'
Acting for someone else involves different motivators and
considerations than acting for one's self alone, such that
common law has not wavered in the strength with which it
has imposed upon fiduciaries the exacting obligation to act
in good faith. 15 5 Courts are clearer about the fact that
156
fiduciaries must act affirmatively for their charges.
interests.
ERNEST W. HUFFCUT, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 90, at 110 (1901) (citing Michoud v.
Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503 (1846)). Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase
"fiduciary duty" to mean:
A duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a
fiduciary (such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such
as a lawyer's client or a shareholder); a duty to act with the highest
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best
interests of the other person (such as the duty that one partner owes to
another).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 545 (8th ed. 2004).

153. EVANS, supra note 147, at 275; accord, UNIF. Bus. CORP. ACT § 33, 9
U.L.A. 186 (1942) ("Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions.").
154. Adler & Mann, supra note 151, at 35.
155. See HUFFCUT, supra note 152, and the text quoted therein.
The duty of the agent to exercise good faith results from the fiduciary
character of the relation. Of necessity the principal must repose
confidence in the agent, and must rely upon his good faith and loyalty
to the interest which is committed to him. The agent must therefore act
solely in the interest of his employer, and not in his own interest or in
the interest of another.
TIFFANY, supra note 15, § 146, at 387.

156. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A fiduciary
duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor,
rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as
the agent would treat himself."); Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 578 (4th
Cir. 1973) ("[Ihf the sellers of control [majority shareholders] are in a position to
foresee the likelihood of fraud on the corporation . . . their fiduciary duty
imposes a positive duty to investigate the motives and reputation of the wouldbe purchaser .... ); Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 211 P. 353, 355 (Mont.
1922) ("[Tjhe fiduciary relationship existing between the United States and the
particular Indian wards imposed upon the government a positive duty to lease
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Moderate attention or care is unacceptable. 157
Professors Adler and Mann discuss at length the
difference in good faith obligations in the context of an
arms-length transaction versus a fiduciary transaction in8

their article Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine.15
Professors Adler and Mann note that the law policing the
area of good faith performance "has been starkly
dichotomous: those contracting parties who are considered
to deal at arm's length receive a substantially lower level of
protection than those who, because of a special relationship
(fiduciary or confidential) between them, are not deemed to
deal at arm's length.' 1 59 As Professors Adler and Mann
observe, parties to a "special" relationship, which would
include fiduciary relationships and relationships of
confidence, such as the trustee-beneficiary relationship, the
agent-principal relationship, the lawyer-client relationship,
and
the
officer/director-shareholder/corporation
relationship, have the obligation to act in a more principled
manner, with the utmost good faith.160
2. All about Duties. Set aside for a moment the
"fiduciary" aspect of the phrase "fiduciary duty." Simply
consider the word "duty." Knowing that directors have
duties (fiduciary or otherwise) is helpful in defining good
faith in the context of a director's fiduciary duties.
A duty is a "legal obligation that is owed or due to
another and that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for
which somebody else has a corresponding right."'161
the Indian lands and to secure for the Indians the most advantageous terms
available ....");Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495,
507 (N.J. 1974) ("[A]n insurer .. .has a positive fiduciary duty to take the
initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage.").
157. See supranote 156 and accompanying text.
158. Adler & Mann, supra note 151.
159. Id. at 31.
160. See id. at 34.

161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (8th ed. 2004).
We can also compare our director-shareholder-corporation relationship to
the "duty-based" relationship a first year law student learns about in his torts
class. The first-year law student is given the following hypothetical in his torts
class:
It is a beautiful spring morning, and a former Olympic swimmer, and her
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husband are going for their morning walk. They walk past the community pool,
where they witness an adorable lab-mix puppy fall into the pool. The puppy is
bobbing and barking, clearly unable to swim despite his lab heritage and semiwebbed feet. Luckily, the Pope, who was formerly a champion swimmer in the
masters division prior to ascending to the papacy, drives by in his Popemobile.
The Holy Father sees the struggling puppy bobbing in the deep end of the pool,
and the Pope selflessly jumps into the pool to rescue the puppy. Unfortunately,
the Pope's papal regalia weighs him down in the water, such that now both he
and the puppy are in trouble.
By pure stroke of chance, the President of the United States, George W.
Bush is jogging by on his morning run, and he jumps into the pool to save the
puppy and the Pope. The President, however, is not strong enough to support
both the Pope in his resplendent regalia and the puppy, and the President is
soon struggling as well.
The former Olympic swimmer witnesses this three-party aqua drama as she
ambles along on her morning walk and she pauses, clearly moved. She hears
the desperate chorus of the trio-the puppy is howling, the Pope calling for help
in Latin, and the President is yelling something unintelligible. The swimmer's
husband says to her "Spouse, you love animals, you are a devout Catholic, and
you still believe the stuff about the weapons of mass destruction. You must save
those three. You have been trained in advanced water rescue, you swam
competitively in the Olympics, you now teach swimming and water safety, and
you know that I cannot save the drowning three because I cannot swim. Please,
please save them. It would be easy for you to save them." In response, the
Olympic swimmer says "I am not about to save them. I have a busy day
planned. I have no time for such tomfoolery. Besides, it will mess up my hair."
The President and the Pope continue to beg for help (or so one assumes, since
neither of them can be understood) as the puppy continues to howl. The
Olympic swimmer looks at them, looks at her husband, and then says "Folks,
sorry. I have a big day today, and I just cannot waste the time to deal with your
problems." She then walks briskly away.
The first-year law student is outraged. "How could that morning exerciser
just leave everyone in the pool to drown? The morning marauder could have
easily saved them. She can't just leave them when she could just as easily have
saved them. It was wrong for her to walk away. Just wrong." In response, the
law school professor explains to his outraged student, "It might have been
morally offensive for the champion swimmer to walk away instead of saving the
pathetic trio, but it was not a liability creating event. The champion swimmer
had no duty to the Pope, the President, or the puppy. Without a duty, we cannot
obligate our innocent bystander to act. Our bystander had no duty to any of the
three."
Such is the rule in tort law-without a duty to act (including having created
a dangerous situation such that you obligate yourself to act), a person has no
obligation to take affirmative action. However, if the bystander has a duty to
the group-if, for example, she was the life guard on her shift-she will be
obligated to take affirmative action to help or be liable. Similarly, a director has
a duty to his corporation and shareholders. The director cannot be passive any
more than the lifeguard can be passive. The same way that the lifeguard has
the obligation to jump in, throw a life ring, call for help, find a life pole, or do
something else affirmatively intended to help the drowning group, the corporate
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Professor Prosser, a forefather of modern tort law, said:
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the
Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which
we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it
necessarily begs the essential question. When we find a duty,
breach and damage, everything has been said. The word serves a
useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be
imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of
events; beyond that is serves none. In the decision whether or not
there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our
ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of
16 2
the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.

Professor Prosser's language pertaining to the
assessment of whether a duty exists raises compelling
points in the context of a director's obligation to act in good
faith: in terms of the hands of history, directors have
always been required to act affirmatively in the best
interests of their charges. In terms of "morals and justice" it
certainly is no moral disservice to a director nor an offense
to justice to obligate directors to do that which they
seemingly agreed to do when they assumed a corporate
leadership
position.
Indeed,
directors
are being
compensated for doing a job.
Moreover, the duty of a director qua trustee or agent of
his shareholder or corporation has always been an active, or
"positive," duty. A positive duty is a duty "that requires a
person either to do some definite action or to engage in a
continued course of action."'63 The duty of a trustee to
affirmatively try to manage the trust assets for the benefit
of the trust beneficiaries requires the trustee to do
something beyond simply refraining from spending the
trust assets for his own personal gain. Such is the case with
all fiduciaries, including directors. The fiduciary is required
to act in the best interest of his principal as opposed to
being required only to refrain from harming the persons

director has the obligation to affirmatively act in the best interest of the
corporation. In first-year torts parlance, the director has a duty.
162. William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
163. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 544 (8th ed. 2004). Note that Black's Law
Dictionary also defines specifically the phrase "duty to act." Black's defines such
as duty as a "duty to take some action to prevent harm to another, and for the
failure of which one may be liable depending on the relationship of the parties
and the circumstances." Id.
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whom the fiduciary serves. 164
3. Allocation of Power and Control. The allocation of
power and control in a director-corporation-shareholder
relationship (and in any fiduciary relationship) is a defining
characteristic of the relationship, 165 and it is important to
consider this almost unfettered power (and corresponding
shareholder powerlessness) in assessing a director's
fiduciary duty to the corporation and shareholders. 66 Given
the powerless position of the shareholder, and given the fact
that the shareholder has entrusted to the director power
over the corporation, the director is in a very different
position than is the arms-length third party who owes no
67
special duty to the party with whom he contracted.
Phrased differently, the plain vanilla party to a contract is
basically allowed to look out for his own interests and
benefit only himself. 168 He is in no special relationship with
respect to the other party-he has no obligation to
affirmatively endeavor to benefit the other party to the
contract, other than doing that which the contract requires.
This is not so when dealing with a fiduciary, who has given
up his disinterested third party status and voluntarily
aligned himself (by accepting a director position) with the
beneficiary. The fact that the beneficiary granted to the
fiduciary the power to act for the beneficiary and the
director qua fiduciary accepted this position of power (and
assumed the related responsibilities) changes the nature of
the relationship from a pure third-party, arms-length or
commercial relationship. 169 The scope of the definition of

164. See Gillette, supra note 108, at 620. This relationship-the fiduciary
relationship-requires something affirmative, and something other than what
is generally required by good faith. The factual context and the power and
control disparities in the fiduciary context mandate something more exacting.
165. See supranote 164 and accompanying text.
166. See generally Dickerson, supra note 76, at 978-85.
167. See Adler & Mann, supra note 151, at 31 ("[Tjhose contracting parties
who are considered to deal at arm's length receive a substantially lower level of
protection than those who, because of a special relationship (fiduciary or
confidential) between them, are not deemed to deal at arm's length.").
168. See supranote 154 and accompanying text.
169. See

1 JAMES D.

Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON

CORPORATIONS § 10.01, at 476-77 (2d ed. 2003) ("In fiduciary relationships, such
as exists between the principal and her agent, the party on whom the principal
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the "duty" of the director, then, should reflect this power
disparity by requiring of the director something focused on
achieving the result a corporation or shareholder
themselves would have sought.
Allan Farnsworth raised an analogous point about
control and power in assessing good faith performance
when he discussed an objective versus a subjective
application of good faith. Professor Farnsworth, when
discussing U.C.C. § 1-208, which deals with "acceleration of
payment or performance 'at will"' and provides that a party
with the power to accelerate payment or performance "do so
only 'if he in good faith believes that the prospect of
payment or performance is impaired,"' observed that § 1208 was noteworthy in that it dealt with good faith
performance from a subjective standard, as opposed to the
other U.C.C. provisions pertaining to good faith
performance, which employed an objective standard. 170
While noting that this U.C.C. provision puts the burden of
proving lack of good faith on the party against whom the
power has been exercised, Professor Farnsworth concludes
that "if the Code makes any change in this regard, it
probably favors the person against whom the power has been
exercised."'171 This indicates that Professor Farnsworth
recognizes the compromised position of the party who lacks
power in a commercial relationship.
To a related point, Professor Gillette discusses good
faith in the commercial actor context, and he argues against
an expansive definition of good faith in part because such
would "extend[] the responsibilities of commercial actors
beyond bargained-for risk allocations."'172 But there is no
similar concern in the director liability context. Even our
relies for representation and protection is not permitted to bargain with the
principal at arm's length or to claim immunity for questionable practices under
the bargaining privilege of caveat emptor. Directors . .. are fiduciaries in a
position of great power.").
170. Farnsworth, supra note 101, at 672 n.33 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-208
(1958)).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Gillette, supra note 108, at 620 (emphasis added); see also id. ("This
conclusion is predicated on arguments that an expansive obligation extends the
responsibilities of commercial actors beyond bargained-for risk allocations,
subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforcement, and does not
produce offsetting benefits in commercial conduct.").
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contractualists would not try to argue that a director's
obligations are purely contractual such that directors can be
treated as arms-length actors with duties defined
accordingly. 173
Ending where we began, the fiduciary must act "solely
in the interest of the beneficiary," and, as Professors Mann
and Adler recall, the cautioning words of then-Judge
Cardozo govern: "Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
[fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place." 174 It is the relationship that directs the
nature and strength of the good faith obligation. The tie
between the trust and reliance of the shareholder and the
director's resulting obligation to act only for the benefit of
the beneficiary is critical to the nature of the meaning of
good faith in the director qua fiduciary context.
It is for these reasons that I oppose adopting wholesale
a definition of good faith from a different area of the law
where good faith might have a well-defined meaning, such
as, for example, in the areas of contract law and commercial
law. I would counsel against any convoluted effort to fit the
good faith definition from those areas or any other areas
into the corporate director context due to the existence of
the above-discussed special relationship in the director
liability context and the resulting factual and legal
dissimilarity to other areas of the law. 175 Borrowing

173. Professors Adler and Mann offer an extensive dialogue on the
substantive difference between good faith in the pure arms-length contracts
realm and in the context of a "special relationship." See Adler & Mann, supra
note 151, at 31.
174. Id. at 35 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
175. See supra Part II.C. I am not alone in my reluctance to adopt in full a
good faith definition from a different area of the law. For example, Professor
Claire Moore Dickerson similarly regards good faith as variable depending on
the legal context; she basically views good faith on a continuum. Dickerson,
supra note 76, at 979 (opining that the lowest level of good faith in contracts
common law might mean only the obligation "to prevent the agreement from
being meaningless, or, in contract terms, illusory"). Additionally, Professor
Clayton Gillette recognizes this difference in good faith definitions, but he views
the differences not as testament to a continuum, but rather as evidence of "the
intractable difficulty of defining the scope of the obligation to perform and
enforce one's contract in good faith." Gillette, supra note 108, at 619. An
interesting observation from Professor Gillette that is relevant later in this
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conceptually to a limited degree from the agency, trust,
insurance, or general fiduciary contexts makes a bit of
sense, as discussed below, given the factual similarities
between the roles of the actors in those contexts and the
director-corporation-shareholder in the corporate context.
Beyond that, any other robust borrowing from other areas
of the law does an injustice to the "trust and confidence"
aspect of the director's role.
D. Useful Observationsfrom Other Areas of the Law
I do not mean to say that some discrete observations
from other areas of the law are of no help. They are of some
help. First, there are some overarching themes among good
faith definitions in various areas of the law that give a
sense of what meaning the phrase "good faith" is often
intended to convey. 176 Second, although the fiduciary
context and the contracts and commercial law contexts are
factually distinct, there can be analogies drawn between
these two areas of the law that prove helpful to discussing
what purpose director liability is arguably intended to serve
in the director liability context. Lastly, the definition of
good faith in the specific fiduciary qua agent, trustee, and
insurer contexts has a global "best interests" flavor to it
that translates well into the director liability context, as
alluded to above. Together, observations about good faith
related to these three points help further create parameters
within which to construct a "good faith" definition for the
director liability context.
With respect to good faith generally, as it comes up in
the law, recall that there are some repeating definitional
themes, as discussed in Part II, supra:

Article in Part II.C is that "[mleasurement of the proper scope of the good faith
obligation requires understanding its intended function in ordering commercial
behavior." Id. at 621. I take the position in Part II.B.3 of this Article that a
director has contractually obligated himself, via a formal or unwritten
employment agreement, to act in the best interests of the corporation. This is, to
me, valuable to remember for the purposes Professor Gillette suggests.
176. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested,
Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 600 (1997)

("An examination of good faith in the other contexts where it has been used
provides a starting point for its definition.").
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(1) "[H]onest[y]";1 77
(2) Fair and full disclosure;
(3) Justified action and absence of improper motives; 178
(4) Action in accord with agreed-upon objectives; 179
(5) Conduct
evincing "an honest purpose to arrive at an
180
agreement";
(6) Exercise of reasonable judgment;' 8 ' and
(7) Absence of bad faith, mala fides, or fraud.
In addition, there is a repeating theme in the fiduciary
realm-that of endeavoring to do the best one can for the
party to whom the fiduciary owes his obligation of trust and
confidence. This appears in the insurance realm, the agenttrustee realm, and in the general fiduciary context. In these
contexts, the good faith obligation is no longer a negative
constraint. Rather, good faith in these contexts is treated as
an affirmative obligation. This affirmative component
cannot simply mean the affirmative obligation to refrain
from doing negative things. That would be duplicative of
the already existing obligation that arises any time good
faith in any context is invoked, including the mere armslength context. Good faith would mean nothing "special" in
the "special" fiduciary context if not doing bad things, being
honest, and acting in the absence of bad motives were the
only things required of a fiduciary acting to satisfy his good
faith obligation. So while it is certainly fair to assume that
good faith in the director liability context includes the

177. Ashford v. Thos. Cook & Son (Bankers) Ltd., 471 P.2d 530, 535 (Haw.
1970) (quoting with affirmance the jury charge of a trial court: "[a] thing is done
in good faith when it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or
not"); see also Davis v. Easley, 13 Ill. 193 (1851).
178. Interestingly, this motive-based assessment of good faith is often
referred to as "bona fides." An actor is required to have "bona fides" in order to
exhibit good faith. This is a curious usage of the phrase bona fides, however,
given that bona fides, literally translated from Latin, means "good faith."
179. See Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1985).
180. In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (citation
omitted).
181. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925(f)(1) (2006) ('Good faith mistake'
[by a peace officer obtaining evidence] means a reasonable judgmental error
concerning the existence of facts that if true would be sufficient to constitute
probable cause.").
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standard things that good faith in all areas of the law
require-honesty, full disclosure, and the lack of bad
faith-there is something more in the director qua fiduciary
context. 8 2 To wit, the fiduciary has a positive duty with
respect to which he is obligated to affirmatively do
something for his beneficiary.
As discussed above, good faith has a well-defined
meaning in the contracts and commercial law realms, and I
have twice been urged by commercial law gurus to consider
adopting the U.C.C. definition of good faith.'8 3 Professor
Mel Eisenberg's recently published article on good faith
discusses various usage options regarding good faith as
defined in the U.C.C. and contracts law. 8 4 Yet given the
special fiduciary nature of the director-corporationshareholder relationship, the director's obligation to act "in
good faith" cannot be treated exactly like the good faith
obligation existing (or not) in the typical arm's length
commercial or contractual relationship. 8 5

182. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary
Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 117 (2004) ("[A] director's fiduciary duty
entails positive actions to benefit the corporation and its shareholders .... ").
183. Many thanks to Professors David Frisch (University of Richmond) and
Tim Zinnecker (South Texas College of Law) for sharing their thoughts.
184. Eisenberg, supra note 52.
185. Adler & Mann, supra note 151, at 33 ("The parties to a contract are
deemed not at arm's length when they have a special relationship, either
confidential or fiduciary. In such relationships the law imposes additional
duties beyond those required in an arm's length transaction upon one of the
parties resulting in 'heightened' protection for the other party. In these
relationships the law establishes a duty of full disclosure, utmost good faith,
and fair dealing.").
For lack of a better place to go further with dispensing specifically of
Professor Summers's "excluder" analysis in terms of its potential to be applied
in the director liability context, allow me to offer the following:
Recall that many commercial and contract law scholars have embraced the
"excluder" method of defining good faith, based on Professor Summer's 1968 law
review article. This excluder analysis, as discussed supra Part II.B.3, entails
defining good faith by reference to the absence of bad faith acts that the phrase
"good faith" is intended to exclude, as a standard of conduct. Summers, supra
note 109. More articles than not on "good faith" in the corporate law realm
define good faith by reference to "bad faith"-a director has acted in "good faith"
if a complaining shareholder has not been able to show that the director acted
in bad faith. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 139, at 482-89 (giving examples of "bad
faith" or violations of the duty of good faith in Delaware case law); Filippo Rossi,
Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court's Triad of FiduciaryDuties 40-43
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(June 22, 2005) (unpublished essay),
available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=755784 (examining the concept of bad faith in Delaware case law and
proposing a test formulated by the House of Lords to assess bad faith). In
addition, as discussed in Part IV, infra, some courts have sidestepped
discussing what good faith is in the context of director behavior by instead
defining what good faith is not. For example, in McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997,
1001 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit gave some definition to what it concluded
would constitute a breach of a director's duty of good faith under Delaware law.
Citing a Court of Chancery opinion authored by Vice Chancellor Strine, the
McCall panel stated that "the duty of good faith may be breached where a
director consciously disregards his duties to the corporation, thereby causing its
stockholders to suffer." Id. at 1001 (discussing Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43,
49 (Del. Ch. 2000)). I do not view Summers's "excluder" analysis and its related
"bad faith" definitional implications for good faith compelling, both in the
abstract and as one would argue could be applied in the director liability
context.
First, the words of Professor Summers's own good faith work indicate that
the "excluder analysis" was not developed with an eye to addressing good faith
in all areas of law, including corporate governance. Admittedly, Professor
Summers often makes general references to good faith in the absolute sense
without limiting his discussion to the contracts or commercial area of law:
If good faith had a general meaning or meanings of its own-that is, if
it were either univocal or ambiguous-there would seldom be occasion
to derive a meaning for it from an opposite; its specific uses would
almost always be readily and immediately understood. But good faith
is not that kind of doctrine.
Summers, supra note 109, at 201.
Yet, this "performance-based" invocation of good faith appears in the bulk of
the article mainly with reference to the commercial or contracts law realms.
There is nothing to indicate that Professor Summers intended to speak
specifically to every other area of the law. Moreover, Professor Summers
generally qualifies his good faith opining after the fact by noting that his
statements pertain specifically to the contracts and commercial areas of law or
by using illustrative facts pertinent only to those areas of the law by saying
things such as "[iun contract law, taken as a whole, good faith is an 'excluder."'
Id. In addition, Professor Summers provides a list of conduct-pertaining to
commercial or contract-related factual scenarios-that constitutes bad faith,
after which he provides related meanings of good faith based on the specific
examples of bad faith conduct in the commercial and contracts law realm. Id. at
203 (discussing situations such as "seller concealing a defect in what he is
selling . . . arbitrarily and capriciously exercising a power to terminate a
contract, . . . [and] adopting an overreaching interpretation of contract
language"). Finally, Professor Summers discusses only the contracts area of the
law when analyzing forms of relief and making proposals regarding the same.
Id. at 252-62 ("IV. Theories and Forms of Relief for Contractual Bad FaithSome Modest Proposals.").
Additionally, the philosophical underpinnings of Summers's "excluder"
analysis do not line up well within the sphere of director liability. Specifically,
Professor Summers says:
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[I]t is appropriate to explain in some detail why the imposition and
refinement of legal standards of good faith are of potentially great
significance in contractual contexts, commercial and noncommercial.
First of all, in these contexts good faith has pervasive and distinctive
relevance. It is natural for two parties to assume that each will act in
good faith toward the other throughout the course of their contractual
dealings. Moreover, morals obligate them to act this way. Yet, in one
sense their interests will remain essentially antagonistic, for each will
be expecting to get something from the other on advantageous terms.
And, in a given case, misunderstandings may arise, unforeseen events
occur, expected gains disappear or dislikes develop which may motivate
one party to act in bad faith.
Id. at 197-98.
Two aspects of this recitation convince me it is imprudent to take the liberty
of importing Professor Summers's good faith analysis from the contracts and
commercial realm to the world of the corporate director qua fiduciary. First,
Professor Summers observes that the two contracting parties at issue in his
discussion have, to a degree, antagonistic interests, "for each will be expecting
to get something from the other on advantageous terms." Id. at 198. This
dynamic simply does not hold when dealing with a director's conduct vis-i-vis
his corporation and its shareholders. See infra Part III. When a director is
acting as a director on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders, the
director is not "expecting to get something from the other on advantageous
terms" in the way the parties in Professor Summers's discussion would be. Id.
at 198. A director's duty of loyalty precludes directors from advancing interests
that are antagonistic to those of the corporation. In addition, the director is a
fiduciary, as discussed above. While the scope of fiduciary relationships vary,
the basic tenet that a fiduciary must act for the benefit of another, as opposed to
"for his own interests," is immutable. Although the common law and statutes
cannot control a director's thoughts, they can, and do, tie a director's hands
such that the director is essentially unable to pursue interests antagonistic to
the corporation or shareholder.
The second aspect of Professor Summers's above-quoted recitation that
bolsters my unwillingness to import his excluder analysis to the corporate
governance realm is his observation that "[i]t is natural for two parties to
assume that each will act in good faith toward the other through the course of
their contractual dealings. Moreover, morals obligate them to act this way." Id.
at 197-98. This language is much weaker than that applicable to the directorcorporation-shareholder relationship. An actionable legal obligation, as opposed
to merely "nature" or "morals" as mentioned by Professor Summers, compels
directors to act in good faith toward the corporation. The parties to an armslength contract with each other are in a significantly different position, with no
such legal obligation. The contractual arms-length context then, in which
Professor Summers explores his good faith excluder analysis, is very different
from the director liability realm, in which the. actors are bound by a legal
obligation much stronger than merely the assumptions (hopes, as it were) of
good faith and moral conduct.
In addition to my contextual concerns with importing the excluder analysis
from Professor Summers's contracts and commercial law article, I also disagree
with Professor Summers as a matter of analytical dogma: just because it is
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difficult to define a legal concept with exacting precision in a way that can be
translated into many contexts does not mean that it should not be defined. See,
e.g., Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1724 (1990) ("Although reasonable doubt is not a precise
concept, its meaning can be made more clear through definition. Mathematical
precision is perhaps impossible, but qualitative definitions can clarify the task
of the jury by providing jurors with 'a concept which they can relate to their own
decision-making processes in their daily personal and business lives."' (citing
United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1981) (Anderson, J.,
concurring))). The United States Supreme Court has said, "In the construction
to be given to words, they are to be received according to their ordinary
meaning and import, or such meaning as is given to them by the common sense
and understanding of mankind." United States v. Prescott, 44 U.S. 578, 581
(1845); accord Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) ("When a word
is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or
natural meaning."). "Good faith" is a phrase that does have a common usage
and is employed in everyday conversation, despite its gossamer feel. "Good
faith" even has a dictionary definition as discussed in Part II.A, supra. While
many in the contracts and commercial law realm have obviously acceded to
Professor Summers's view that good faith should be viewed as an excluder,
without its own precise meaning, I believe it neither prudent nor necessary to
move the director liability jurisprudence in that direction.
I hasten to add that even scholars in Professor Summers's own field have
opposed his excluder analysis of good faith. Dennis M. Patterson offered:
The reason the excluder analysis will not work for good faith is that
both good faith and bad faith are "substantive hungry": they are each
parasitic notions that require host concepts. The excluder analysis
cannot work without the existence of a substantive notion upon which
the excluder term does its work. Summers never supplies the
substantive host, and for that reason alone his claims for the "felicity"
of the excluder analysis cannot be sustained. In making his case for the
excluder analysis, Summers fails to separate the need for clarification
of a fuzzy concept from concepts that are totally parasitic on other
notions .... If "good faith" were an excluder, it would have meaning
only in relation to other legal concepts, but in Summers'[s] analysis, it
does not.
Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith
Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 34849 (1988).
In addition, Professor Summers concedes that no less than the venerable
contracts guru E. Allan Farnsworth has viewed good faith differently than
simply as a tool to prevent certain bad faith conduct. Summers, supra note 109,
at 233 n.158 ("One writer has even suggested that the sole significance of good
faith is 'in implying terms in the agreement."' (quoting Farnsworth, supra note
101, at 670)). After Professor Summers wrote his initial good faith article,
Professor Steven J. Burton responded with an article in the Iowa Law Review,
wherein he argued that an excluder analysis is not necessarily the only way to
deal with good faith performance. See Steven J. Burton, Good Faith
Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981). Professor Steven Burton also is not convinced that good
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That said, a fair bit of the "good faith" language in the
contracts context is worth considering, as it is apropos of
concepts that are transferable from the contracts realm into
the corporate law realm. Moreover, as employees, directors
have contractual ties to the corporation in addition to the
fiduciary ties, such that the definition of good faith in the
contracts and commercial law realms at least provides a
minimum standard against which to judge a director's
86
conduct. 1
As noted previously, the Second Restatement of
Contracts ties good faith to the reasonable expectations of
the parties: "Good faith performance or enforcement of a
contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party .... ,,187 The phrases "faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose" and "consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party" both could be added to the
faith is too gossamer to be defined:
Though some scholars have suggested that good faith under the U.C.C.
is a necessarily vague concept, perhaps intended to give the courts
leeway to impose equitable requirements on contract parties, the courts
generally have not so approached the good faith performance
provisions. Rather, good faith performance, as used by the courts,
generally serves to effectuate the intentions of the parties, or to protect
their reasonable expectations.
Id. at 3. Professor Summers then penned another good faith article, see Robert
S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982), to which Professor Burton
replied, see Burton, supra note 109. This extended scholarly exchange provides
an interesting academic read.
Moreover, we see that the alleged impracticability of finding a meaning of
good faith independent of bad faith is disproved by the fact that the draftsmen
of the U.C.C. were able to define and include a definition of good faith in the
Code (the defining language has existed since the initial 1949 draft of the Code),
as Summers himself concedes. Summers, supra note 109, at 207 ("It is evident
that the Code draftsmen were not, in 1949, thinking of good faith as an
'excluder.' Rather, they viewed it as a positive concept, with a general, definable
meaning of its own.").
186. See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 513 ("A director who agrees to adhere
to the terms of a corporate charter must do so in good faith: he must honestly
try to be loyal; he must do his best to use care; and he must honestly try to
carry out any other promise he has made to those who have entrusted him with
control of their corporation. Good faith is merely a way of interpreting whether
the parties adhered to the duties imposed upon them by the corporate charter
or by contractual agreement.").
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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assemblage of useful language for purposes of defining a
director's good faith obligation, as they do make sense in
the director liability context. Directors obviously have an
agreed purpose with the shareholders, to wit, benefiting the
corporation and its owners. The one thing that the
shareholders have in common with the directors is the
corporation. An agreed common purpose, then, must include
something with respect to that corporation. Within the
range of corporation-related agreements, it seems likely
that the shareholders implicitly agree with the directors
that the directors would act
in the corporation's and the
1
shareholders' best interests. 88
Moreover, the "justified expectations" language invoked
often in the commercial and contracts areas of the law can
be easily overlaid on both the director's fiduciary and
employment contract-based good faith obligations. Given
that good faith in the contractual context includes the
notion that the parties to the contract accord with the
reasonable expectations they had when executing the
contract,18 9 it seems that a shareholder's reasonable
expectations with respect to the director she was electing or
hiring would include the expectation that the director
would at least try to act in the best interest of the
corporation. While the justified expectations of the
shareholder would certainly include some expectation of
calculated risk and honest misjudgment, and justified
expectations cannot reasonably include the expectation of
perfect decision-making by the directors, "justified
expectations"
surely
would
not
include
lethargy,
ambivalence, lack of urgency when such is appropriate, and
sleeping while on the job.
At the very least, it seems that "justified expectations"

188. Other agreements would include the implicit agreement that the
directors will do a decent job but will make no effort to do the best job that they
can or the agreement that the directors will do a perfect job. Of the range of
potential implicit agreements, it seems that an agreement on acting in the best
interests of the corporation would be reasonable.
189. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981)
("Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party . . . ."); Burton, supra note 185, at 3 ("[G]ood faith performance,
as used by the courts, generally serves to effectuate the intentions of the
parties, or to protect their reasonable expectations.").
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must include something in addition to refraining from
acting in bad faith. It is inconceivable that a shareholder's
and potential director's expectations would hinge merely on
the agreement that the director not do anything "bad,"
deliberately against corporate interests. Who would hire an
employee-or give one's power to an employee-who only
undertook to essentially refrain from doing bad things?
What investor would ever vote affirmatively for a director
who promised only to not try to hurt the corporation? What
reasonable investor would have such non-ambitions for her
directors?
III. THE DEFINITION
Above I provided the tools with which to construct at
least a "rough draft" affirmative (not excluder-based, that
is) definition of good faith in the director context: I have
reviewed good faith definitions from other areas of law and,
in deference to the contextual nature of such definitions,
examined more closely the fiduciary context in which good
faith in the director liability context appears. I went
through good faith definitions in other areas of the law, and
I made what I view as justifiable decisions on what to
import to the director liability context and what to leave
behind. Upon review of the above options for defining good
faith, I can best justify consulting the dictionary, 190
reflecting the common law regarding fiduciaries, and, in
part, picking from the well-evolved contracts and
commercial law good faith definitions.
From these sources, it is clear that most definitions of
good faith, and certainly those discussed above, include
some aspect of honesty. No venal conduct or trickery is
allowed. Beyond that, "dedication to agreement" comes up
regularly, and adherence or commitment to reasonable
expectations is a frequent refrain. This language pertains to
the good faith actor's sincere attempts to "do what she has
agreed to do." In terms of performance, good faith means

190. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or Not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security
Blanket for Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 637,
676-80 (2004) (discussing textualism and defining words in accordance with
their plain meaning); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S.
865, 874 (1999) (consulting a dictionary to determine the plain meaning of the
word "coal").
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that the actor shall give his or her honest attempt to
perform in the way the parties agreed upon. 191 In addition,
in the context of a fiduciary, good faith takes on a loyalty
component which obligates the fiduciary to act in the best
interests of the person he serves.
From here, I can construct a sensible definition of good
faith for use in the director liability context as a starting
point for further discussion. 192 I make no claim of being able
to definitively espouse good faith in full, -in a manner ripe
for adoption by the corporate bar, academy, and bench
alike. Rather, I offer a "first draft," if you will, of the
definition of good faith, as a good faith attempt to wellenough define the phrase to stimulate further discussion:
"good faith" as used in the director liability context
(obligating a director to act "in good faith") can be
reasonably summarized to mean that a director must act in
the corporation's best interest. 93 Good faith in the director
191. I am not sure that I have done enough research to convince myself that
I could say that good faith requires "best efforts," though I have no trouble
maintaining that a director's fiduciary obligation to act in good faith requires
some level of effort proportionate to the issue at stake. Note that Professor
Farnsworth has said:
[g]ood faith is a standard that has honesty and fairness at its core and
this is imposed on every party to a contract. Best efforts is a standard
that has diligence as its essence and is imposed on those contracting
parties that have undertaken such performance. The two standards are
distinct and that of best efforts is the more exacting, though it
presumably falls short of the standard required of a fiduciary ....
FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.17c.

192. When I initially conceived of this Article, I intended to present one,
succinct, almost universally-applicable definition of good faith for use in the
director liability context. Though I still propound that is possible, I have
changed my goal for the Article to a more modest one. It strikes me that it is
sensible to have more discussion about a draft good faith definition before
committing to a terminal definition of good faith.
193. In terms of the objectivity or subjectivity of the phrase "good faith,"
that discussion might itself merit its own law review article. At least one
scholar in the corporate realm has concluded that a director need only act in
subjective good faith. See Sale, supra note 139, at 488 ("Good faith based
liability, then, moves the bar . . . to deliberately indifferent, egregious,
subversive, or knowing behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the
motives of the actors."). Yet the late Professor Allan Farnsworth adamantly
(and logically, I would submit) argued that good faith performance cannot be
judged on a subjective standard. See Farnsworth, supra note 101, at 671-73.
"Surely the test is not whether one party actually believed that he was acting
decently, fairly or reasonably. Surely he must do more than form an honest
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liability context includes honesty, and it includes action
focused on the reasonable expectations of the shareholders
and corporate investors. It, however, requires more than
that. As in the agency, trust, and insurance fiduciary
contexts, good faith in the director context requires actions

judgment. Otherwise no more than knowing and deliberate unfairness,
maliciousness, trickery and deceit would be forbidden." Id. at 672. Indeed, if
nothing more than an honest heart was required of our directors, it would be
very difficult for shareholders to ever vindicate any sort of mismanagement. See
Kevin S. Shmelzer, Comment, The Door Slammed Shut Needs to be Reopened:
Examining the Pleading Requirements Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 426 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of
pleading scienter and its effect on corporate governance and accountability).
By enacting the higher hurdle of needing to plead deliberate
recklessness for a securities fraud claim . . . it appears as though
investor confidence in corporate entities will continue to erode as
investors will encounter an even more difficult burden before being
allowed to enter a courthouse. Congress should take note of the current
corporate atmosphere and realize that the heightened inference
requirement has resulted in making it more difficult to bring all
securities fraud suits, including meritorious cases.
Id.
Recognition of the historical evolution of the phrase "good faith" is useful in
developing more a context within which to define good faith. Recognizing the
original role of good faith in the context of the law gives at least a hint for
determining what specifically good faith could mean. To that end, good faith has
long been a way to legalize conscience. See J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN
ENGLISH LAW 8 (1990). To the extent that law and morality are tied together in
a form most recognizable as equity, good faith was the common thread tying
together law and equity. As moral law and cannon law merged and morphed,
good faith remained as the vestige of a quasi-moral obligation. Id. Professor
O'Connor discusses the evolution from a conscience based jurisdiction to one
based on equity by saying that there was an "increasing awareness of the
distinction between individual conscience and rules operating in foro conscientie
and the general conscience of the realm and rules operating in foro externo." Id.
This shift makes more understandable the fact that good faith might well
obligate a director to act in his own subjective good faith, but review will be
conducted on an objective good faith standard. Id. at 53. Professor O'Connor
says:
Directors must act "bona fide in what they consider-not what a court
may consider-is in the best interests of the company and not for any
collateral purpose". [sic] What is required is that the directors must do
what they honestly believe to be right-i.e. subjective good faith-and
here, as in other areas of the law where subjective good faith is
required, they will normally succeed in satisfying this test unless it can
be shown (objectively) that they have not behaved in accordance with
the standards expected of honest and reasonable men ....
Id. (footnotes omitted)(emphasis removed).
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or decisions focused on furthering the best interests of the
up power and control to, and exhibiting trust
party giving 194
in, the actor.
194. Conduct in the best interests of the shareholders certainly must have a
reasonableness threshold or materiality, otherwise directors would be obligated
to act as super-officers, essentially repeating the job done by the officers in
managing the corporation and constructing disclosure documents. If the
director knows how to read financial statements and has a sense of what red
flags look like, it is likely that the director has acted in the best interest of the
shareholders by doing nothing more than that which he has done. Good faith
cannot possibly require obsessive behavior, perfection, or double verification by
the directors of each numerical item of financial disclosure. Good faith should
perhaps be defined as conduct that is in the best interests of shareholders,
given the context and circumstances, and reflects the fact that directors are not
(and are not required to be) forensic accounting experts.
In the case of In re CaremarkInt'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996), the court recognized that there is a contextual element to the
meaning of an action in the best interest of shareholders:
The vocabulary of negligence while often employed, is not well-suited to
judicial review of board attentiveness, especially if one attempts to look
to the substance of the decision as any evidence of possible
"negligence." Where review of board functioning is involved, courts
leave behind as a relevant point of reference the decisions of the
hypothetical "reasonable person", [sic] who typically supplies the test
for negligence liability. It is doubtful that we want business men and
women to be encouraged to make decisions as hypothetical persons of
ordinary judgment and prudence might. The corporate form gets its
utility in large part from its ability to allow diversified investors to
accept greater investment risk. If those in charge of the corporation are
to be adjudged personally liable for losses on the basis of a substantive
judgment based upon what an [sic] persons of ordinary or average
judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as "prudent"
"sensible" or even "rational", such persons will have a strong incentive
at the margin to authorize less risky investment projects.
Id. at 967 n.16 (citations omitted).
Indeed, one wonders on what moral basis might shareholders attack a
good faith business decision of a director as "unreasonable" or
"irrational". [sic] Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to
be informed and to exercise appropriatejudgment, he or she should be
deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention. If the shareholders
thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than
such a director produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of
office, then the shareholders should have elected other directors. Judge
Learned Hand made the point rather better than can I. In speaking of
the passive director defendant Mr. Andrews in Barnes v. Andrews,
Judge Hand said:
True, he was not very suited by experience for the job he had
undertaken, but I cannot hold him on that account. After all it
is the same corporation that chose him that now seeks to
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IV. THE REMAINING ISSUE: "NOT IN GOOD FAITH"

Defining good faith in the director liability context is
important, in and of itself, to give directors behavioral
standards. However, I see defining good faith as equally
important for purposes of creating the foundation on which
the phrases "the absence of good faith" or "acts or omissions
not in good faith" can be constructed. Although a director is
obligated to act in good faith, and, for that reason, I have
endeavored in this paper to affirmatively define "good
faith," a director's legal and monetary liability exposure
rests on whether a plaintiff can show that the director
committed acts "not in good faith." 195 What is an act "not in
good faith," and how does one assess whether a director is
acting in the absence of good faith? A comprehensive
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
but a summary of the issue is worthwhile. 196
In the corporate law realm over the past several years,
courts 197 and, worse, academics have consistently defined
charge him .... Directors are not specialists like lawyers or
doctors .... They are the general advisors of the business and

if they faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge,
it would not be lawful to hold them liable. Must a director
guarantee that his judgment is good? Can a shareholder call
him to account for deficiencies that their votes assured him
did not disqualify him for his office? While he may not have
been the Cromwell for that Civil War, Andrews did not engage
to play any such role.
Id. at 968.
195. Remember from Part I that a director will not receive the benefit of the
statutory exculpation from personal liability for acts "not in good faith." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Moreover, note from Part IV that, while
good faith is presumed to exist under the business judgment rule presumption,
if a plaintiff can show that the director did not act in good faith, the business
judgment rule protection will be stripped from the director, subjecting the
director's complained of actions to the more rigorous "reasonable and fair"
standard of review.
196. In a forthcoming article, Not In Good Faith,I address this issue in full.
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not In Good Faith,60 SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
197. Most recently, in the Disney derivative litigation, Chancellor Chandler
of the Delaware Court of Chancery offered two definitions on two different
occasions for acts not in good faith. First, in 2003, in denying the motion of the
Disney directors to have the claims against them dismissed, the Chancellor
said:
Instead, the facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the
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this phrase "not in good faith" (the absence of good faith,
that is) to mean the same thing as "bad faith,"
notwithstanding the fact that an act "not in good faith" is
not necessarily the same as an affirmative act "in bad
faith."'198 I object to defining an act that is not in good faith
(such that the director loses the protection of the business
judgment rule presumption and does not fall within the
protection of a DGCL § 102(b)(7)) to mean a "bad faith act."
Bad faith has been defined as "dishonesty of belief 2or
00
purpose"'19 9 or "[dishonest] motive or . . . purpose,"
requiring the "conscious doing of a wrong because of
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . [and] a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill

defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities, adopting a "we don't care about the risks" attitude
concerning a material corporate decision. Knowing or deliberate
indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with
appropriate care is conduct, in my opinion, that may not have been
taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the
company. Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the
defendant directors knew that they were making material decisions
without adequate information and without adequate deliberation, and
that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation
and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
In 2005, in the post-trial memorandum, Chancellor Chandler said:
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that the
concept of intentionaldereliction of duty, a conscious disregardfor one's
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) standard for
determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Deliberate
indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind,
conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. It is the epitome of
faithless conduct.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Both of these definitions say nothing about bad faith, yet the Delaware
Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court and specifically sanctioning this
language, refers to the language and standard as definitions of "bad faith." In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 (Del. 2006).
198. I say "and worse, the academics" because the courts might have
somehow viewed themselves bound to certain definition. Academics have the
luxury of not being bound to any misinterpretation of the law.
199. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 2004).
200. Brittingham v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rehoboth Beach, No. 03A-08-002,
2005 WL 1653979, at *2 (Del. Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished opinion).
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will."'20 1 Bad faith is provable in the corporate law context
by showing "that the board's decision was so egregious or
irrational that it could not have been based on a valid
assessment of the corporation's best interests '202 or that the
decision "is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith. '20 3 Yet, as discussed above, an
act "in good faith" is an act in the best interests of the
shareholders and corporation, such that an "act[U or
omission[U not in good faith" 20 4 is an act that is not in the
best interests of the shareholders or corporation. An act
"not in good faith," then, is not necessarily the same as an
affirmative act "in bad faith" any more than a fruit that is
not an apple is necessarily an orange. 205 The latter is
201. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II,
L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993).
202. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).
203. Id. (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 78081 (Del. Ch. 1988)).

204. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., Idaho v. Prestwich, 783 P.2d 298, 302 (Id. 1989) (Bistline, J.,
concurring) ("The trial judge did not find good faith; he only found lack of bad
faith. I submit that the two are not synonymous." (citation omitted)); Art Form
Interiors, Inc. v. Columbia Homes, Inc., 609 A.2d 370, 375 (Md. Ct. App. 1992)
("We view with considerable consternation the disturbing lack of good faith...
but we are not prepared to hold that the appellants' actions constituted bad
faith .... "); Zdravkovich v. Bell Atlantic-Trion Leasing, Corp., 592 A.2d 498,
403 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) ("The District Court's finding that Zdravkovich 'has not
shown good faith' is not the equivalent of a finding of 'bad faith' and cannot be
the basis for the imposition of sanctions."); Commonwealth v. Belcher, No. F88140, 1988 WL 619393, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) ("Although the court finds no
bad faith, the court does not find good faith here either.").
As well, there might be another opinion regarding "good faith," "not in good
faith," "bad faith," and "not in bad faith." The "no faith" option was discussed in
Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
when the court analyzed an insurance company's refusal to defend an insured
against the insurer's fiduciary obligation to exercise good faith in defending or
settling claims against an insured. "In the case before us, there is no threshold
question of 'good faith' vs. 'bad faith.' For here, the company exercised no faith
at all." Id.
Richard Rector describes the distinction found in some cases between the
violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and an affirmative finding of
bad faith as "noteworthy, if slightly metaphysical." Richard Rector, Infotech and
the Law: Good Faith, Bad Faith in Government Contracts, WASH. TECHNOLOGY,
(Apr. 17, 2000), available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/print
/15_20/16188-1.html. Mr. Rector further observes that this suggests that "good
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actually a sub-category of the former, and the former
embraces much more than does the latter. Courts that
substitute the phrase "bad faith" 206 when common law or
the statutes refer to merely the lack of good faith are
actually making new common law and rewriting DGCL §
102(b)(7) (and analogous statutes). The "bad faith"
bastardizing of the English language significantly changes
both common law and the meaning of statutes such as
DGCL § 102(b)(7) in a way that is prejudicial to
shareholders. The impact of this mutilation is particularly
noteworthy when dealing with abdication or inattentionbased fiduciary duty cases.
While the linguistic distinction between an act that
exhibits a lack of good faith on the part of the actor versus
an act that exhibits bad faith might not be important in
casual conversation, the distinction becomes very important
in legal discourse when reviewing facts in which it is
alleged that the director should be stripped of the
protections of the business judgment rule presumption or
should not be afforded the protections of a charter provision
adopted under DGCL § 102(b)(7) or a similar statute. To
require the plaintiff to plead and prove bad faith
affirmatively would require the plaintiff to prove that the
director acted with ill will, consciously committed a wrong,
or engaged in acts so egregious that they are virtually
inexplicable for any reason other than bad faith. Proving
bad faith requires much more than is required to prove that
an act taken was not taken in good faith.
Many courts and academics seem oblivious to the fact

and bad faith are not mirror images of one another ... the government can fail
to act in good faith without necessarily acting in bad faith." Id. (quoting an
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals case in which the board observed
that "[t]he mere absence of bad faith ... does not mean the government met its
obligation ...

to negotiate in good faith").

206. See, e.g., In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch.
1999) (dismissing shareholder claim for breach of the duty of good faith because
"[1]ittle or nothing in the Complaint speaks in terms of bad faith misconduct or
disloyalty"); McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing
a plaintiffs attempt to plead that directors acted "not in good faith" as the
phrase is used in DGCL § 102(b)(7), the court said "[b]ad faith is 'not simply bad
judgment or negligence,' but rather 'implies the conscious doing of a wrong
because of dishonest purpose of moral obliquity . . . it contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will' (quoting Desert
Equities,Inc., 624 A.2d at 1208 n. 16)).
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that they are, with nary a bit of explanation, setting for
shareholders a much higher burden of proof than the long
existing common law and exculpatory state statutes
actually require. 207 Distinguishing conduct that is "not in
good faith" from conduct that is taken "in bad faith" is
certainly not an overly ambitious distinction when dealing
with a fiduciary. It is not enough for a fiduciary to just not
do bad things. The fiduciary is supposed to affirmatively try
to do the right things. 208 The fiduciary has a duty, an
obligation. More is required of a director qua fiduciary than
is required of parties to an arms-length transaction.
Therefore, many of the same reasons why I was adverse to
defining good faith by borrowing a good faith definition
from other areas of the law are relevant when assessing
whether "bad faith" can be used as a substitute phrase for
"the failure to act in good faith" (or "the absence of good
faith").
To condone the continued definition of the lack of good
faith as synonymous with bad faith does away with part of
the affirmative nature of a director's obligation to act in
good faith. Inasmuch as "bad faith" acts basically include
only very egregious acts-acts such as fraud or deliberately
reckless behavior-courts are setting new policy and
changing the obligations of directors by essentially freeing
the directors of the obligation to exercise a level of attention
and monitoring that rises to the level of "in the best
interests of the shareholder." For a fiduciary-someone who
has the obligation to act affirmatively for the shareholderthis loss of an inattention-based category of liability is
preposterous.
The shareholders will now be left with a board that
cannot be held accountable for conduct that evinces a total
lack of thought (e.g., the typical "asleep at the wheel" case).
A total abdication of duty, with no mal fides, will be beyond

207. The Delaware Supreme Court itself recently defined "bad faith" when
assessing whether the lack of good faith had been pled, completely ignoring the
fact that the application of DGCL § 102(b)(7), which was at stake in the case,
hinged on an assessment of whether the acts or omissions complained of were
taken 'not in good faith."' In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
65 (Del. 2006).
208. See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 512 ("Fiduciary duties are substantive
obligations which must be honored in good faith in the same way that
contractual obligations must be honored in good faith.").
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the reach of an indignant shareholder. That simply cannot
be acceptable behavior under the definition of "good faith"
as it pertains to a fiduciary. Good faith does not
contemplate lack of attention regarding that which the
fiduciary has agreed to support. Good faith does not
contemplate a lack of attention paid to that which the
fiduciary has been trusted to do.
Given an affirmative definition of what good faith
requires, interpreting the "not in good faith" language of
DGCL § 102(b)(7) and the business judgment rule
presumption as a jurisprudential matter to allow a
complaining shareholder to point to the absence of
affirmative good faith (as opposed to the existence of
affirmative bad faith) to substantiate her claim that the
director failed to meet his obligation to act in good faith is
straightforward. A complaining shareholder plaintiff who is
trying to either rebut the business judgment rule's
presumption of a director's good faith or show that the
director is outside the protection of a charter provision
adopted under DGCL § 102(b)(7) would articulate the
definition of good faith and then identify facts that show
that the acts of the directors do not fit within the definition
of "good faith." The burden would still be on the plaintiffs to
prove that the directors did not act in good faith, and,
though "proving" a negative is perhaps a counter-intuitive
concept, it certainly
is not an ethereal task from a practical
20 9
standpoint.
209. Some might worry that this analysis means that the directors will no
longer be automatically given the protection of the business rule presumption.
That worry is not merited; the directors will still receive the benefit of the
presumption. If the plaintiffs cannot rebut the presumption of good faith by
showing that, actually, good faith acts-acts in the best interests of the
shareholders-were lacking or the acts at issue do not fit within the phrase "in
the best interests of the shareholders," a director will forever hold the protection
in that case.
I had an interesting debate on the internet about a point related to this topic
with Benjamin Nelson. See Elizabeth Nowicki, The Disney Opinion and "Not in
Good Faith," Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com
archives/2006/06/thedisneyopin.html (June 9, 2006) (my initial posting);
Benjamin Samuel Nelson, Prototypes and Negations: One Interpretation of
Nowicki's Intuition, Law & Society Blog, http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/
archives/208 (June 10, 2006) (Nelson's response); Elizabeth Nowicki, Benjamin
Nelson and "Good Faith,"Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2006/06benjamin-nelson.html
(June 20, 2006) (my reply);
Benjamin Samuel Nelson, Faith and Act (A Rejoinder to Nowicki), Law &
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CONCLUSION

Director liability jurisprudence is on the cusp of taking
a sharp turn away from mainstream fiduciary duty common
law, due to the bar's and the academy's apparent
unwillingness to affirmatively, usefully define and analyze
good faith and the continued bastardizing of the meaning of
the failure to act in good faith. While some might argue
that these wordsmith failures achieve the best possible
result by insulating directors from liability in all but the
most vulgar circumstances, that result-which is contrary
to decades worth of fiduciary common law-is a result that
is more appropriately achieved by legislative action.
Though state legislatures perhaps intended to insulate
their directors from everything but bad faith actions, the
language of statutes such as DGCL § 102(b)(7) should not
210
be unjustifiably mutilated to achieve that result.
It is hard to conceive of a world where the obligation of
a director, who is tied in a fiduciary relationship to the
shareholder and/or the corporation, will move from the
obligation "to be loyal to the trust imposed in him, and to
execute it with the single purpose of advancing his
principal's interests,"211 to the mere obligation to refrain
from doing things that evince "some sort of obvious,
deliberate, or egregious failure. '21 2 Yet, as I attempted to
show in this Article, the perversion of the phrases "good
faith" and "not in good faith" threaten to achieve exactly
this shift, which, I maintain, would render impotent the
bedrock faithfulness principles of the director's fiduciary
position. Before this linguistic lapse turns into a
substantive departure from long-established fiduciary
common law, it makes sense for the bench, the bar, and the
academy to engage in a more thoughtful analysis of what
good faith should demand from a director.

Society Blog, http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/210
(Nelson's rejoinder).

(June 21,

2006)

210. It is very unlikely indeed that legislators could have gotten away with
adopting a standard prohibiting directors only from "affirmatively acting in bad
faith." I imagine their constituents might object mightily, were this flimsy
language brought to their attention.
211.

HUFFCUT,

supra note 152, at § 90 (emphasis added).

212. Sale, supra note 139, at 493.
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I offer my above analysis of, and attempt
defining
"good faith" as mustard seeds, for the single at,
purpose of
furthering the discussion about good faith and encouraging
a more academically demanding investigation into the
definition of good faith. My definition of good faith might
prove distasteful to the academy, and one of my brethren
might counter with a better definition. I welcome such a
response, as my goal is not to establish my definition as the
sine qua non, but, rather, to stimulate more good faith
debate about good faith.
I am not suggesting that today's boards are sloppy,
inadequate, or otherwise consistently reproachable. I am
suggesting, however, that a more exacting definition of
"good faith" will either discourage potentially half-hearted
directors from serving or will give rise to a market in
professional directors. Either result is, in my view, a good
result.

